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COMMENT

An Investor-State Dispute Mechanism in the
Free Trade Area of the Americas: Lessons
from NAFTA Chapter Eleven
JESSICA S. WILTSEt
INTRODUCTION

One central actor, the nation state, has traditionally
dominated international relations and international law.
The state has long enjoyed exclusive access to public
international legal regimes and remedies and exclusive
political jurisdiction over transnational disputes in which a
sovereign is a party. As a result, if a non-state party, such
as an individual, an organization, a corporation or an
investor, were to find itself involved in a transnational
dispute with a foreign government, its most likely recourse
would be to petition its home government to act on its
behalf to resolve the dispute with the foreign government
t J.D. Candidate, State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law, 2004;
M.A., State University of New York at Buffalo, 2003; B.A., State University of
New York at Buffalo, 2000. I wish to thank George H. Bilkey IV for his support
and encouragement and Professor Amy Westbrook of the University at Buffalo
Law School for her thoughtful guidance and valuable comments. I would also
like to thank the members of the Buffalo Law Review for their assistance in
editing the drafts of this article. All errors and inconsistencies remain, of
course, my own.
1. For example, private industries might petition the United States Trade
Representative ("USTR") to commence a Section 301 case to investigate alleged
unjustifiable or unreasonable trade practices of other states and to retaliate
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Another equally imperfect option for the non-state
party would be to use the domestic legal system of the
foreign government or to try to obtain jurisdiction over it in
the private party's domestic courts.2 This solution is
particularly problematic for U.S. non-state parties when the
claim is against a foreign nation, because the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 ("FSIA")3 expressly limits
the jurisdiction of U.S. courts in suits against foreign
sovereigns. And even in those circumstances where the
FSIA does not bar jurisdiction, as is arguably the case in
international investment disputes,4 U.S. courts will not
inquire into the validity of an act by a foreign sovereign
within its own jurisdiction, including disputes relating to
foreign investment contracts, according to the act of state
doctrine.5
unilaterally if the allegations are correct. See Trade Act of 1974 § 301, 19 U.S.C.
§ 2411 (1994). This can lead to a World Trade Organization ("WTO") case
between governments. To protect against imports, private industries may ask
the Commerce Department to initiate an antidumping or countervailing duty
investigation. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673, 1677 (2000). The important point here,
however, is that the private party or industry must always ask the government
to act on their behalf.
2. See Glen T. Schleyer, Power to the People: Allowing Private Parties to
Raise Claims Before the WTO Dispute Resolution System, 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
2275, 2301 (1997).
3. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (2000).
4. The FSIA provides for at least two exceptions that probably preclude
immunity. First, immunity does not apply to suits arising out of a foreign
sovereign's "commercial activity" having a "direct effect in the United States."
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). A foreign sovereign's obligations under an investment
contract may qualify as "commercial activity." See Michael D. Ramsey, Acts of
State and Foreign Sovereign Obligations, 39 HARv. INT'L L.J. 1, 10-11 (1998).
The second possible exception to foreign sovereign immunity is when the
sovereign waives immunity, which is a provision that may be drafted into an
investment contract. FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1).
5. See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) ("[Tjhe courts of one
country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done
within its own territory."); see also Ramsey, supra note 4, at 11 (discussing how
the act of state doctrine, and not the FSIA, is the principal barrier to the
enforcement of foreign investment contracts in U.S. courts). In contrast to
foreign sovereign immunity, the act of state doctrine is an expression of judicial
self-restraint, and as such is not "waivable" by a foreign state. Thus, while
sovereign immunity is a question of personal jurisdiction (or lack thereof) over a
foreign sovereign, the act of state doctrine is more concerned with the act of the
defendant foreign sovereign and whether it is proper for the home state
judiciary to decide the issue in question. See MARK W. JANIS & JOHN E. NOYES,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY 807 (2d ed. 2001); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW

§ 443 (1987).
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However, a new paradigm is emerging in which
individuals and private entities may also avail themselves
of international legal remedies.6 As the international
system has evolved after World War II, with the creation of
numerous international legal treaties and organizations
such as the United Nations ("UN"), the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") and now the World Trade
Organization, and the pace of globalization has steadily
increased, there is growing recognition of the variety of
actors in this new world order, non-state actors that have
separate interests from their national governments, and
interests that need to be represented if this rapidly
interconnected and globalized system is to sustain itself and
progress. Among these new actors are international nongovernmental organizations ("NGO"), such as Greenpeace
and Amnesty International, and multinational corporations.
In the realm of international trade, investment, and
economic relations, the need for private party access to
dispute resolution is particularly notable, because of the
rapidly growing volume of international trade facilitated by
the success of liberal trade ideologies and the growing
number of firms engaged in multinational business. New
forms of dispute resolution evolved to meet this need,
particularly international arbitration for private commercial parties. Yet, there remained little direct recourse for
private parties as against injury caused by a foreign
sovereign's unfair and even illegal trade and investment
policies .8
Although Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation ("FCN") have created reciprocal bilateral
6. See Noemi Gal-Or, Private Party Direct Access: A Comparison of the
NAFTA and the EU Disciplines, 21 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 2 (1998).
7. For example, the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law ("UNCITRAL") Arbitration Rules were adopted in 1976, providing
comprehensive arbitration procedure rules for commercial parties to use on an
ad hoc basis. G.A. Res. 31/98, U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, 31st Sess.,
Supp. No. 17, at Ch. V, § C, U.N. Doc. A/31/17 (1976). The UNCITRAL Rules
are just one example of international arbitration rules available to private
commercial parties; earlier examples provided both rules and formal arbitral
institutions, such as the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the
International Chamber of Commerce (Paris) (1923), and the American
Arbitration Association (1926).
8. An illegal trade or investment policy would be one that violates a trade
agreement, such as the WTO or NAFTA.

1148

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

economic relationships and provided for state to state
dispute resolution for centuries,9 it was not until the years
following World War II that such treaties began providing
non-diplomatic remedies for injured investors. Eventually,
as the volume and importance of international investment
increased, and as the international economic system as it
existed failed to deal with investment issues, FCNs were
replaced or supplemented with more modern and
specialized Bilateral Investment Treaties ("BIT"), whose
primary function was to promote and protect investment
relations between the two parties to the BIT.11 Most
significantly, however, BITs provided for direct investorstate arbitration of investment disputes before an arbitral
panel, eliminating the need for espousal by governments
and depoliticizing investment disputes. 2
By the early 1990s, the bilateral solution to investment
disputes proliferated in the absence of a multilateral
investment regime. Although multilateral trade law has
flourished in the years following World War II, with the
evolution of the GATT and regional trade and economic
agreements like the European Economic Community (now
the European Union ("EU")) and North American Free
Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"), a multilateral investment
regime had been slow to materialize.13 Against this
background, Chapter 11, the investment chapter of NAFTA,
stands out as an innovative response to this deficit. It is the
first, and only, multilateral trade agreement that provides
9. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Reassessingthe Hickenlooper Amendment, 29
VA. J. INT'L L. 115, 115-24 (1988) (discussing the historical development of
investment dispute resolution mechanisms).
10. Following World War II, "modern" FCNs were negotiated, which usually
provided for adjudication of disputes before the International Court of Justice.
Although this was a procedural advancement from the viewpoint of United
States investors, it still required espousal by the U.S. government before the
ICJ. See id. at 121-23.
11. See id. at 162-65.
12. See id. at 163-64.
13. For instance, the Trade Related Investment Measures ("TRIMs")
Agreement of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations created a very limited
multilateral investment agreement, and the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development's ("OECD") attempt at negotiating a Multilateral
Agreement on Investment ("MAI") in the mid-1990s was ultimately a failure.
See generally Glen Kelley, Multilateral Investment Treaties: A Balanced
Approach to Multinational Corporations, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 483
(2001); see also the discussion of the difficulties of negotiating a multilateral
investment treaty, infra Part III.C.
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for direct investor-state binding arbitration. 4 In the nine
years since NAFTA came into force, 5 there have been a
number of claims brought under the investor-state dispute
mechanism. 6 The claims asserted, and the outcomes of
them, have been surprising at times and Chapter 11 is
increasingly becoming the focal point of the controversy
surrounding free trade and its negative effects
on the
17
environment and the sovereignty of the state.
Despite the continuing controversy over free trade,
negotiations are currently underway for the Free Trade
Area of the Americas ("FTAA"), which would unite the
thirty-four democratic nations of the Western Hemisphere
(essentially all of the nations of the hemisphere except
Cuba) 8 into the largest free trade area in the world,
encompassing over 800 million people and representing a
GDP in excess of $12 trillion. 9 The FTAA will also
encompass perhaps the most diverse group of states to join
a regional trade agreement, given the large range of
economic development within the Western Hemisphere,
differing levels and lengthiness of democratic governance,
and rich and varied cultural tapestry." As the NAFTA
14. See Chris Tollefson, Games Without Frontiers: Investor Claims and
Citizen Submissions Under the NAFTA Regime, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 141, 143
(2002).
15. The U.S. Congress ratified NAFTA in November 1993, and NAFTA
entered into effect in January 1994. For the legislation implementing NAFTA,
see the North American Free Trade Implementation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No.
103-1082, 107 Stat. 2057 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3473).
16. See Appendix A, infra, for a list of known Chapter 11 claims.
17. See Charles H. Brower II, Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA: The
Empire Strikes Back, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 43, 44 (2001); David R. Haigh,
Q.C., Chapter 11 - Private Party vs. Governments, Investor-State Dispute
Settlement: Frankenstein or Safety Valve?, 26 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 115, 116 (2000).
18. The 34 countries are: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas,
Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala,
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname,
Trinidad and Tobago, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
19. Population and GDP (U.S.D.) as of 2001, taken from the World Bank
Group's Website, World Development Indicators (WDI) Data Query, at
http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query (last visited Aug. 20, 2003). On the
database, the countries selected for review were the United States, Canada and
Latin America & the Caribbean. The series selected were GDP (current U.S.D.)
and Population (total) for the year 2001.
20. See Mark B. Baker, Integration of the Americas: A Latin Renaissance or
a Prescriptionfor Disaster?, 11 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 309, 326-27 (1997)
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agreement is serving as the primary model for the FTAA
agreement, it is imperative that we evaluate its features for
the desirability of their inclusion." Among the features
being hotly debated are the investment provisions of
Chapter 11 of NAFTA, which provide investors of a Party,
defined as one of the three NAFTA signatories (Canada,
Mexico, and the United States), with substantive rights and
guaranteed minimum standards of treatment, and both a
state-state and an investor-state mechanism for resolving
disputes arising from breaches thereof.22 This controversial
chapter has
23 already been incorporated into the draft text of
the FTAA.

The purpose of this article is to analyze the pros and
cons of including a NAFTA Chapter 11-like provision in the
FTAA Agreement, negotiations for which are to conclude by
2005.4 Rather than debating about whether such a
provision should or should not be included in the FTAA, an
increasingly moot consideration, this article takes the
position that an investor-state dispute mechanism will
likely be incorporated into the FTAA, and therefore we
should attempt to improve on it in light of our experience
with NAFTA Chapter 11. A careful review of experience
with NAFTA Chapter 11 can help us to avoid simply
replicating an investment provision riddled with problems
while ignoring the particular context of the proposed FTAA
Agreement. Part I lays the foundation for the discussion by
examining the history and mechanics of NAFTA Chapter
11, providing an overview of the substance of the provision.
A discussion of three important cases that have been
decided using the Chapter 11 investor-state procedure will
shed some light on how Chapter 11 works in practice. Part
(discussing how the diversity of Latin America makes integration there
different from other trading blocs such as the European Union).
21. See generally David M. Gilmore, Free Trade Area of the Americas: Is it
Desirable?,31 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 383 (2000) (discussing the competing
forces behind the FTAA and whether it will be NAFTA-centric or MERCOSURcentric).
22. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex.,
32 I.L.M. 289 (1993), 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
23. See the second draft text of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (Nov. 1,
2002), at http://www.alca-ftaa.org/alca-e.asp (last visited Aug. 20, 2003)
[hereinafter FTAA Draft].
24. See Christopher M. Bruner, Hemispheric Integration and the Politics of
Regionalism: The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), 33 U. MIAMI INTERAM. L. REV. 1, 7 (2002).
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II presents the various arguments in favor of and against
both private party access to international dispute resolution
mechanisms in general, and Chapter 11 arbitration in
particular. Part III assesses the inclusion of an investorstate dispute mechanism in the FTAA, taking into account
the particular problems such a provision may pose in
negotiations with Latin American states. This part will also
briefly address the difficulties in attempting to negotiate
investment treaties multilaterally, such as the failed
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's
("OECD") Multilateral Agreement on Investment ("MAI").
Finally, Part IV considers several proposals and
suggestions to improve Chapter 11, given the reality that
the provision is likely a permanent feature of the North
American and Western Hemispheric free trading regimes.
I. THE NAFTA INVESTMENT CHAPTER
A. HistoricalBackground
Because private parties traditionally lacked standing
under international law, throughout most of history trade
and investment disputes between private parties and states
were usually resolved between states (the home state of the
private party and the host state) through diplomatic or
political channels (i.e., diplomatic protection) or by the use
of actual force.25 By the mid-twentieth century, however, the
capital-exporting nations began to shift strategies in order
to counter the ineffectiveness of such dispute resolution. As
liberal economic ideologies became dominant following
World War II, institutionalized in the Bretton Woods
economic framework, the United States and other capitalexporting nations undertook the development of a regime to
improve the protection of investments abroad. Treaties of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation were entered into
bilaterally, the major purpose of which was to protect
foreign investments.6

25. See Ray C. Jones, NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-to-State Dispute
Resolution: A Shield to Be Embraced or a Sword to be Feared?, 2002 BYU L.
REV. 527, 529 (2002); Vandevelde, supra note 9, at 116-20.
26. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Sustainable Liberalism and the International
Investment Regime, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 373, 382-83 (1998).
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FCN treaties fell short of a panacea, however, because
FCNs still only provided for sovereign-to-sovereign dispute
resolution, albeit in a more legalistic manner, and even
occasionally in the adjudicative forum of the International
Court of Justice ("ICJ").2 Espousal by the investor's home
state was still necessary, but now claims were to be decided
at the ICJ rather than through diplomatic channels. This
proved rather unsatisfactory to private parties and states
alike, because the ICJ was reluctant to become a forum for
resolving international commercial disputes and would thus
decline such cases on jurisdictional grounds. The prime
example of this scenario is the Barcelona Traction case,
where the ICJ denied standing to the Belgian government
to espouse the claims of its citizens, who were the majority
shareholders of a corporation established under the laws of
Canada but with its principal place of business in Spain.29
According to the ICJ, "the general rule of international law
authorizes the national State of the company alone to make
a claim."3 In this case, however, because Spain had not
consented to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, Canada
was unable to bring the claim.3' The Belgian shareholders
were effectively deprived a remedy, despite that they owned
about 88% of Barcelona Traction's shares32 and that the
Belgian and Spanish governments were parties to a
bilateral treaty that recognized the ICJ's jurisdiction to
hear disputes arising from the treaty.33
This historical reliance on the investor's home
government to represent its interest was the main impetus
behind the development of Bilateral Investment Treaties in
the 1970s and 1980s, which are the genesis of NAFTA
Chapter 11 investor-state dispute resolution. 4 BITs were
designed to provide investors with a "shield" to protect their

27. See Todd S. Shenkin, Trade-Related Investment Measures in Bilateral
Investment Treaties and the GATT: Moving Toward a Multilateral Investment
Treaty, 55 U. PiTT. L. REV. 541, 548-49 (1994) (discussing the historical
development of FCNs and BITs).
28. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3,
7, 46-51 (Feb. 5).
29. Id. at 7.
30. Id. at 46.
31. Id. at 45.
32. Id. at 24.
33. Id. at 11.
34. See Jones, supra note 25, at 529-30.
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interests from host nations.35 Furthermore, BITs, unlike
FCNs, usually provide for direct investor-state arbitration,
eliminating the need for espousal by the home state.36 The
form of the typical U.S. BIT evolved over time to eventually
include, by 1981, the two fundamental canons of the
NAFTA model: (1) the exact language and legal standard of
expropriation, and (2) an investor-state dispute mechanism
providing for direct enforcement of this and other investor
protections. 37 BITs are utilized by most major capital
exporting countries and are becoming increasingly popular
with less-developed countries,38 with almost 200 countries
having signed at least one BIT, and a total of approximately
2099 BITs in place worldwide by the end of 2001.'9
In addition to the shortcomings of FCNs, another direct
impetus of the development of an investor-state dispute
mechanism in BITs, from the perspective of the investor's
country, was the need to respond to the problems foreign
investors encountered as a result of the popularity of the
Calvo Doctrine in Latin America. ° Carlos Calvo, an
Argentinean scholar, developed a theory in the midnineteenth century to counteract the use of power politics
and force to resolve international trade and investment
disputes.41 The Calvo Doctrine was based on two main
points:
(1) sovereign states, being internationally equal and independent,
should enjoy the right to absolute freedom from interference by
other states, either through force or diplomacy; and (2) while

35. Id.
36. Shenkin, supra note 27, at 549.
37. See Joel C. Beauvais, Student Article, Regulatory ExpropriationsUnder
NAFTA: Emerging Principles & Lingering Doubts, 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 245,

252-53 (2002).
38. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development ("UNCTAD")
Website, UNCTAD: Developing CountriesFurther Liberalize Their FDI Regime

in 2001, at http://rO.unctad.org/en/subsites/dite/ bitdtt.htm (last updated Aug.
28, 2002)[hereinafter UNCTAD Website].
39. See id. This represents a significant increase from the approximately
1300 BITs in place worldwide by the end of 1998. See Beauvais, supra note 37,
at 253. Even just between 2000 and 2001, the number of total BITs in effect
worldwide increased by 158 from 1941. UNCTAD Website, supra note 38.
40. For a discussion of the Calvo Doctrine in Latin America, see Denise
Manning-Cabrol, The Imminent Death of the Calvo Clause and the Rebirth of
the Calvo Principle:Equality of Foreign and NationalInvestors, 26 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 1169 (1995).
41. Id. at 1171-73.
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aliens should be given equal treatment with nationals, they are
not entitled to "extra" rights
42 and privileges and thus may only
seek redress in local courts.

The Calvo Doctrine essentially limited foreign investors to
the same rights and remedies available to domestic
investors in the host country's domestic court system.4
A
without interference by the investor's home government.
44
relief.
This often left foreign investors unable to obtain
However, the changes in the global political-economic
environment following World War II eventually reached
Latin America, and adherence to the Calvo Doctrine slowly
began to deteriorate. The role of FCNs and BITs between
the United States and Europe and Latin America was of
considerable importance in triggering the move away from
the Calvo Doctrine and toward affording certain protections
to foreign investors. 45 Yet, in many Latin American states,
this shift was slow to materialize. For instance, Mexico had
traditionally adhered to the Calvo Doctrine, up to the time
46
that NAFTA was being negotiated in the early 1990s.
Thus, the inclusion of Chapter 11 was a necessary objective
of both the United States and Canada during the NAFTA
negotiation process. 47 NAFTA represented "the first time
that Mexico has entered into an international agreement
providing for investor-state arbitration."" For Mexico, the
potential gains in joining NAFTA, in the form of increased
market access to the United States and Canada, and
increased foreign direct investment in Mexico from those
countries, were so great as to induce Mexico to alter its
foreign investment laws to come into compliance with

42. Jones, supra note 25, at 529-30.
43. See RAJ BHALA & KEVIN KENNEDY,

WORLD TRADE LAW: THE

SYSTEM, REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, AND U.S. LAW

GATT-WTO

186 (1998).

44. See id.

45. See the discussion of the demise of the Calvo Doctrine in Latin America,
infra Part III.A.
46. See BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 43, at 186.
47. Id.

48. Daniel M. Price & P. Bryan Christy, III, An Overview of the NAFTA
Investment Chapter: Substantive Rules and Investor-State Dispute Settlement,
in NAFTA: A NEW FRONTIER IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN THE

AMERICAS 177 (Judith H. Bello et al. eds., 1994).
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NAFTA, thereby representing the abandonment of the
Calvo Doctrine for Mexico.49
In light of the proliferation of BITs, and the move
toward peaceful dispute resolution, the inclusion of binding
investor-state arbitration in NAFTA should come as no
surprise. None of the NAFTA Parties previously had BITs
with each other.5" Furthermore, the evolution of free trade
regimes has resulted in an ever-broadening scope of
coverage, encompassing many aspects of international
economic relations besides merely trade in goods, such as
trade in services, investment, and intellectual property
protection, to name a few. Yet, NAFTA is significant in that
it is the first, and as of yet the only, multilateral trade
agreement to include a comprehensive investment chapter
providing for binding investor-state arbitration. 1 As one
observer noted, "NAFTA's Chapter 11 is, in essence, a trilateral investment treaty grafted onto an arrangement
which is otherwise largely directed at establishing
liberalization and fairness in the trade of goods and
services." 2
B. Overview of the Substance and Procedure
NAFTA Chapter 11 has three objectives: first, "to
establish a secure investment environment through the
elaboration of clear rules of fair treatment of foreign
investments and investors"; second, "to remove barriers to
investment by eliminating or liberalizing existing
restrictions"; and third, "to provide an effective means for
the resolution of disputes between an investor and the host
government."53 Part A of Chapter 11 provides the
substantive obligations of the Parties concerning the
treatment of investments, while Part B establishes the
49. See Gregory M. Starner, Taking a ConstitutionalLook: NAFTA Chapter
11 as an Extension of Member States' ConstitutionalProtection of Property, 33
LAW & POLY INTL Bus. 405, 412-17 (2002) (discussing the evolution of Mexico's
takings and foreign investment laws through NAFTA).
50. Robert K. Paterson, A New Pandora'sBox? Private Remedies for Foreign
Investors Under the North American Free Trade Agreement, 8 WILLAMETTE J.
INT'L L. & DISPUTE RES. 77, 85 (2000). Note that, while NAFTA is not
technically a BIT, it eliminates the need for one between any of the Parties
because Chapter 11 provides comprehensive investment provisions.
51. Tollefson, supra note 14, at 142-43.
52. Haigh, supra note 17, at 129.
53. Price & Christy, supra note 48, at 172.
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mechanism by which investors can resolve claims against
the host government for breaching the substantive
obligations. For the sake of brevity, this Comment will
address and consider only briefly those provisions that are
relevant to the topic at hand.
1. The Substantive Obligations (PartA). The breadth of
the investment chapter is addressed in the Scope and
Coverage provisions (Article 1101), which has been
interpreted quite broadly. Chapter 11 applies to all
measures54 adopted or maintained by a Party relating to: (a)
investors" of another party and (b) investments" of
investors of another Party in the territory of the Party.
The first substantive obligations of Chapter 11 are
national treatment (Article 1102),"7 and Most-Favoredtreatment (Article 1103),58 which
Nation ("MFN")
essentially require that each Party treat other NAFTA
investors and their investments no less favorably than it
treats its own investors and their investments (national
treatment) or investors or investments of third parties
(MFN treatment). A PartXy must confer the better of
national or MFN treatment.
NAFTA also sets up minimum standards of treatment
(Article 1105), requiring a NAFTA Party to treat
investments of investors of another Party in accordance
with customary international law principles, including "fair
and equitable treatment" and "full protection and
Significantly, even if a measure is not
security.""
discriminatory on its face, it may still violate Article 1105,
because "[t]he minimum standard described in Article 1105
does not refer to measures themselves (such as laws,

54. The definition of "measure" is extremely broad, and specifically includes
any "law, regulation, procedure, requirement or practice" of a Party. NAFTA,
supra note 22, art. 201.
55. The definition of "investor" is similarly broad, meaning anyone seeking
to make, making, or having an "investment." Id. art. 1139.
56. "Investment" is subject to a lengthy definition in Article 1139, and
includes ownership, equity, real estate, and all forms of tangible and intangible
property, including intellectual property. Id.; see also Price & Christy, supra
note 48, at 173.
57. NAFTA, supra note 22, art. 1102.
58. Id. art. 1103.
59. Id. art. 1104.
60. Id. art. 1105(1).
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regulations61 and decisions) but to the administration of
measures."
Performance requirements are prohibited by Article
1106. 2 This prohibition is designed to eliminate trade
distortions arising from such requirements, and to ensure
entrepreneurial autonomy in investment decisions.63 While
the imposition of certain performance requirements as a
condition for receiving incentives are specifically prohibited,
requirements other than those specifically listed in Article
1106 are permitted. 64 Because the ability to transfer or
repatriate profits and capital is vital to foreign investors,
Article 1109 (Transfers) requires the Parties to freely allow
all transfers that relate to investments of investors of
another Party.65
It is the expropriation provision (Article 1110),66
however, that is generating the most controversy. In fact,
according to one scholar, expropriation is "the most
controversial aspect of foreign investment in the past
century."67 Article 1110 generally prohibits direct or indirect
nationalization or expropriation, or measures "tantamount"
to expropriation of NAFTA investments.68 Article 1110
provides that the expropriation of an investment of an
investor is prohibited unless it is done for a public purpose,
on a non-discriminatory basis, in accordance with due
process of law, and on payment of prompt, adequate
compensation,69 meaning fair market value paid in G7
currency.70
What exactly is "tantamount" to expropriation is
unclear. The NAFTA definitions in Article 1139 do not
include a definition of "expropriation" or of "measures
tantamount to expropriation." Several claims brought
under Chapter 11 have asserted that governmental
regulations in the areas of the environment or human
safety are tantamount to expropriation because such

61. Paterson, supra note 50, at 97.
62. NAFTA, supra note 22, art. 1106.
63. Price & Christy, supra note 48, at 174-75.
64. Paterson, supra note 50, at 98.
65. NAFTA, supra note 22, art. 1109(1).
66. Id. art. 1110.
67. Paterson, supra note 50, at 102.
68. Price & Christy, supra note 48, at 175-76.
69. NAFTA, supra note 22, art. 1110(1).
70. Id. art. 1110(2), (4).
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measures effectively nullify the investor's expectations of
his investment.7 ' However, certain governmental acts are
specifically not expropriatory, such as compulsory licensing
of intellectual property.7
Furthermore, Chapter 11
explicitly excludes several listed government programs
(including public education, social welfare and health) from
its provisions.73 It does not, however, specifically mention
environmental and safety measures as excluded. 4 Article
1114, Environmental Measures, provides, "[Niothing in this
chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from
adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise
consistent with this chapter that it considers appropriate to
ensure that investment activity in its territory is
undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental
concerns."7 At first, this provision appears to allow for
broad environmental protection by the Parties, but the
words "otherwise consistent with this chapter" subordinate
the section to the rest of the provisions, suggesting that
they must first not be expropriatory before they can be
considered legitimate according to 1114.6
The scope of the expropriation provision of Chapter 11
is perhaps the most widely criticized aspect of the whole
chapter. Most of the controversy over the chapter, and most
of the cases arising under it, focus squarely on what
governmental actions are legitimate and which are
"tantamount to expropriation" and thus prohibited. As the
case law77 develops, the Chapter 11 panels are beginning to
establish a few guidelines in the definition of expropriation." But because panel decisions are not binding except as

71. Paterson, supra note 50, at 103.
72, NAFTA, supra note 22, art. 1110(7).
73. Id. art. 1101(4).
74. Id.
75. Id. art. 1114(1).
76. See Paterson, supra note 50, at 105.
77. I use case law for lack of a better term, because as arbitration
proceedings, decisions are not technically case law as we understand it in a
common law system, and because such decisions have no precedential, or even
necessarily persuasive, value.
78. See the respective tribunals' reasoning in Metalclad Corp. v. Mex.
(ICSID Additional Facility), Sept. 2, 2000, available at http://www.
naftaclaims.com (last updated Aug. 17, 2003); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Can.
(UNCITRAL), June 26, 2000, available at http://www.naftaclaims.com (last
updated Aug. 17, 2003); and S.D. Myers v. Can. (UNCITRAL), Nov. 13, 2000,
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to the Parties to the particular dispute, 9 the development of
case law is not going to clarify the scope of the Chapter.
2. The Investor-State Dispute Mechanism (PartB). The
second half of Chapter 11, Part B, is devoted to the
investor-state dispute settlement mechanism. The NAFTA
Parties have consented in advance to the jurisdiction of
Chapter 11 arbitration panels by adopting and
implementing the NAFTA Agreement. ° There are several
conditions attached to the use of the investor-state dispute
mechanism in Part B. First, the claimant investor of one
Party, or his investment, must have suffered loss as a result
of another Party breaching a substantive provision of Part
A of Chapter 11.81 Claims must be brought within three
years of when the investor first acquired, or should have
acquired, knowledge of the breach and knowledge of the
loss or damage,82 but may not be brought within six months
of the event giving rise to the breach. This latter provision
is intended to encourage negotiations and consultations. In
addition, the investor must notify the host Party at least
ninety days before submitting the claim to arbitration.84
The applicable arbitration rules are provided in Article
1120 (Submission of a Claim to Arbitration) and allow an
investor to submit a claim under (1) the International
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID")
Convention, if both the host country and the investor's
home country are parties to the Convention, (2) the
Additional Facility Rules of the ICSID Convention, if either
the host country or the investor's country are a party to the
Convention, or (3) the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") Arbitration Rules.
The first set of rules currently cannot apply because the
United States is the only NAFTA Party that is currently a
party to the ICSID Convention, and the second set of rules
only applies where one party is the United States or a U.S.

available at http://www.naftaclaims.com (last updated Aug. 17, 2003); see also
infra Parts I.C.1-3.
79. NAFTA, supra note 22, art. 1136(1).
80. Id. art. 1122(1).
81. Id. arts. 1116(1), 1117(1).
82. Id. arts. 1116(2), 1117(2).
83. Id. arts. 1120(1), 1118.
84. Id. art. 1119.
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investor." "Of the three procedural options, the UNCITRAL
rules are the widest and most flexible."86 UNCITRAL
arbitration is available to any United Nations member
state, and thus all three NAFTA Parties may use them.87 In
practice, the UNCITRAL Rules have been used
approximately twelve times, while the ICSID Additional
Facility Rules have been utilized approximately eight
times. The applicable substantive law is the NAFTA
agreement itself and the applicable rules of international
law. 9
There are also several procedural conditions precedent
to submission of a claim to arbitration embodied in Chapter
11 itself, independent of the procedural arbitration rules
selected. The investor must, in writing delivered to the host
Party, consent to arbitration in accordance with the
procedures set out in the NAFTA Agreement, and must
"waive the right to initiate or continue before any
administrative tribunal or court under the law of any
NAFTA Party, or other dispute settlement procedures...
except for proceedings for injunctive, declaratory, or other
extraordinary relief not involving the payment of
damages."9 Because Chapter 11 arbitration panels are only
able to award monetary damages (plus interest) or
restitution of property," investors are not required to waive
their right to seek specific relief or other relief in domestic
courts.
The arbitration panel is composed of three arbitrators,
one appointed by each of the disputing parties and the

85. Paterson, supra note 50, at 107.
86. Id. at 108.
87. See Andrew J. Shapren, NAFTA Chapter 11: A Step Forward in
International Trade Law or a Step Backward for Democracy?, 17 TEMP. INT'L &
COMP. L.J. 323, 330 (2003).
88. I say approximately because there are several cases in which no
documents have been made public and thus it is not possible to determine
which rules were used. Likewise, cases that were abandoned/withdrawn after a
Notice to Arbitrate was served were never really arbitrated under the rules
specified in the Notice. I nevertheless counted such cases if they specified which
rules the claim was intended to be arbitrated under. A list of NAFTA Chapter
11 claims, and which arbitration rules, if known, were chosen, is included in
Appendix A, infra.
89. NAFTA, supra note 22, art. 1131(1).
90. Price & Christy, supra note 48, at 178-79.
91. NAFTA, supra note 22, art. 1135(1).
92. Price & Christy, supra note 48, at 178-79.
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third, the presiding arbitrator, chosen by agreement of the
disputing parties," or appointed by the Secretary General of
ICSID after ninety days.94 Non-disputing NAFTA Parties
may also make submissions to Chapter 11 panels, upon
written notice to the disputing Parties, regarding the
interpretation of NAFTA.95 As mentioned, awards made by
a Chapter 11 panel "have no binding force except between
the disputing parties and in respect of the particular case."96
The NAFTA Parties are, by agreement, expected to honor
and enforce the awards of the panels within their own
jurisdiction, but should enforcement in domestic courts
become necessary, all the NAFTA Parties are also
signatories to the 1958 United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
(the "New York Convention").
C. Claims Decided on the Merits
It is difficult to precisely identify the number of Chapter
11 proceedings that have taken place, because there is no
official case-reporting requirement."
As
a result,
information about the cases is often incomplete and
unreliable. By my count, there have been thirty-two Notices

93. NAFTA, supra note 22, art. 1123.
94. Id. arts. 1124, 1126. Panels established according to the ICSID Rules or
ICSID Additional Facility ("AF") Rules follow the procedures set forth in Article
1124 for constituting an arbitral panel. Article 1126 sets forth the procedures
when the parties utilize the UNCITRAL Rules. In both cases, however, if the
Parties are unable to agree on a Presiding Arbitrator, the Secretary-General of
ICSID is designated to choose one from the ICSID Arbitrator roster. Id.
95. Id. art. 1128.
96. Id. art. 1136(1).
97. The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards (New York Convention), June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S.
38.
98. The NAFTA Parties do not have to make information about the cases
publicly available. However, the U.S. State Department maintains a list of
Chapter 11 cases involving all three Parties on its website, at www.state.gov
(last visited Sept. 19, 2003). A privately run website also maintains a list of
citations to Chapter 11 decisions, at http://www.naftaclaims.com (last updated
Aug. 17, 2003). This is probably the most comprehensive list and the website
also provides portable document file (PDF) versions of many of the documents.
In addition, several investors have made information about their cases publicly
available, either on their own website or through their attorney. See, for
example, a list compiled by Appleton & Associates International Lawyers,
NAFTA Cases, at http://www.appletonlaw.com (last visited Sept. 19, 2003).
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of Intent to Arbitrate submitted, of which roughly twenty
have proceeded to the establishment or call for the
establishment of an arbitral panel.99 To date, seven Chapter
11 panels have produced an arbitration award on the
merits.00 Of the seven cases in which final awards were
rendered, the investor's claim succeeded in whole or in part
in four.'
Because this comment is primarily concerned with the
implications of the Chapter 11 provisions, only three of the
cases brought thus far and decided on the merits under the
investor-state dispute mechanism are discussed. These
cases are illustrative of the controversy surrounding
Chapter 11, and generally highlight some of the most
problematic aspects of the chapter, particularly the scope of
the chapter and the broad meaning being given to
"expropriation", and how this is affecting the NAFTA
Parties' ability to effectively regulate the environment and
human safety within its territory. The cases also illustrate
that the panels are grappling with the problem of how to
delineate between "regulations" and "expropriations," and
are in practice attempting to do so. Although panel
decisions have no precedential value,0 2 it is likely that they
99. The actual number may well be higher, because there is no casereporting requirement. See Appendix A, infra, for a list of Chapter 11 claims,
and their varying statuses. By "call for the establishment of a panel," I mean
that the investor has submitted a Notice of Arbitration (as opposed to merely a
Notice of Intent to Arbitrate).
100. The seven cases are: Azinian v. Mex. (ICSID Additional Facility), Nov.
1, 1999; Waste Management, Inc. v. Mex., No. 1, June 2, 2000; Metalclad Corp.
v. Mex. (ICSID Additional Facility), Sept. 2, 2000; S.D. Myers Inc. v. Can.
(UNCITRAL), Nov. 13, 2000; Pope and Talbot, Inc. v. Can. (UNCITRAL), April
10, 2001; Karpa v. U.S. (ICSID Additional Facility), Dec. 16, 2002; and ADF
Group v. U.S. (ICSID Additional Facility), Jan. 9, 2003. All citations, and links
to some documents, are available at http://www.naftaclaims.com (last updated
Aug. 17, 2003).
101. Metalclad Corp. v. Mex. (ICSID Additional Facility), Sept. 2, 2000,
available at www.naftaclaims.com (last updated Aug. 17, 2003) (the U.S.
company was awarded $16.685 million U.S.D.); S.D. Myers Inc. v. Can.
(UNCITRAL), Nov. 13, 2000, available at www.naftaclaims.com (last updated
Aug. 17, 2003) (the U.S. investor was awarded CAN $6.05 million, the
equivalent of $3.87 million U.S.D. in November 2000); Pope and Talbot, Inc. v.
Can. (UNCITRAL), April 10, 2001, available at www.naftaclaims.com (last
updated Aug. 17, 2003) (partial award to U.S. investor); and Karpa v. Mex.,
Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1 (ICSID Additional Facility), Dec. 16, 2002, available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/feldman-mexico-award-en.pdf (indicating
a partial award to a U.S. investor).
102. NAFTA, supra note 22, art. 1136(1).
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will be at least persuasive to future panels, as most of the
arbitrators and attorneys involved are experienced in the
common law tradition. And, interestingly, the decisions to
date appear less favorable to investors and fatal to state
than some of Chapter l's critics would have us
sovereignty
3
0
believe.
1. Metalclad Corp. v. The United Mexican States."'
Metalclad Corporation, a U.S. company, initiated a case
against Mexico in January 1997, alleging violations of
Articles 1105 (Minimum Standards of Treatment) and 1110
(Expropriation) regarding Metalclad's development of a
hazardous waste disposal facility in San Luis Potosi,
Mexico. °5 The Mexican federal and state governments had
issued permits to Metalclad in 1993, and in 1994, Metalclad
complied with new environmental standards that came into
effect." 6 When the landfill was completed in 1995, Mexican
state and municipal authorities prevented Metalclad from
operating it by declining to issue a building permit.0 7 After
Metalclad initiated arbitration with Mexico under the
ICSID Additional Facility Rules, the state government of
San Luis Potosi declared the area of the landfill a " 'natural
area' for the protection of a rare cactus."'0 8 The Chapter 11
tribunal upheld Metalclad's minimum standard of
treatment claim, holding that Metalclad was entitled to rely
on the state and federal government's assurances and the
issuance of permits, as the federal government had
supremacy over the municipality. 19 With regard to the
expropriation claim, the tribunal set forth the following
definition:
expropriation under NAFTA includes not only open, deliberate and
acknowledged takings of property, such as outright seizure or
103. See Beauvais, supra note 37, at 248 (arguing that the NAFTA tribunals
have interpreted the expropriation provision rather conservatively, and that the
broad interpretations thus far of the national treatment and minimum
standards of treatment provisions are more troubling and should be the focus of
reform).
104. For the various documents associated with this arbitration, see
www.naftaclaims.com (last updated Aug. 17, 2003).
105. Beauvais, supra note 37, at 268.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See id. at 268-69.
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formal obligatory transfer of title in favour of the host State, but
also covert or incidental interference with the use of property
which has the effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in
significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected economic
benefit of property
110 even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of
the host State.

Because the municipality denied Metalclad's permit
without basing it on the physical construction or defect in
the site, and also because of the federal government's
representations to the claimant, the tribunal found that
these actions amounted to indirect expropriation and
awarded Metalclad
approximately
$17
million in
damages.' Moreover, the broad expropriation definition
alarmed Chapter l's critics and seemed to validate their
claims that Chapter 11 will be used to prevent Parties from
enacting and enforcing environmental
and health
regulations.112
2. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. The Government of Canada."'
Pope & Talbot, an American lumber company, brought a
claim against the Canadian government in March 1999,
alleging that Canada's allotment of softwood export quotas
violated NAFTA Articles 1102 (National Treatment), 1105
(Minimum Standard of Treatment), 1106 (Performance
Requirements), and 1110 (Expropriation).1
The expropriation claim is particularly important here, as the Pope &
Talbot tribunal issued the first interpretation of the scope
of Chapter l1's expropriation provisions."' While the
tribunal held that market access is a "property interest
subject to protection under Article 1110 [expropriation],""
110. Metalclad Corp. v. Mex., Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award (Aug. 30,
2000), 16 ICSID Rev.-Foreign Inv. L.J. 168, 195 (2001).
111. See Beauvais, supra note 37, at 269.
112. See, e.g., Jenny Harbine, NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitration:Deciding the
Priceof Free Trade, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 371, 372-73 (2002).

113. For the various documents associated with this arbitration, see
www.naftaclaims.com (last updated Aug. 17, 2003).
114. See David A. Gantz, Potential Conflicts Between Investor Rights and
Environmental Regulation Under NAFTA's Chapter 11, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L.
REV. 651,694 (2001).

115. See id. at 695.
116. Interim Award, Pope & Talbot, Inc. and Gov't of Can., 96, at 33 (June
26, 2000), availableat http://appletonlaw.com/cases (last visited Sept. 19, 2003)
[hereinafter Pope & Talbot Interim Award].
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it also held that Canada's actions in relation to Pope &
Talbot did not constitute so-called "creeping" or constructive
expropriation, " defined as actions that have the effect of
" 'taking' the property, in whole or in large part, outright or
in stages.
According to the tribunal, the test is
"whether ... interference is sufficiently restrictive to
support a conclusion that the property has been 'taken'
'
from the owner."119
"Expropriation, creeping or otherwise,
requires a 'substantial deprivation' of the enjoyment of
property rights; the reduction in Pope & Talbot's profits...
20
does not constitute such a substantial deprivation.',
The Pope & Talbot tribunal continued this conservative
approach by holding that the phrase "tantamount to
[nationalization or] expropriation" does not "[broaden] the
ordinary concept of expropriation under international law
to require compensation for measures affecting property
interests without regard to the magnitude or severity of the
effect.' 12' "Tantamount" means "equivalent.' 22 Measures are
covered only12if they achieve the same results as
expropriation.
With respect to the national treatment claim, the
tribunal interpreted it broadly in favor of investor
protection, holding that discriminatory effects could be
determinative of whether an investment had been
discriminated against, and that intentional or purposeful
discrimination was not necessary. 12
By construing
expropriation relatively narrowly, and national treatment
and minimum standards of treatment more broadly in favor
of investors, the Pope & Talbot decision underscores the
point that the expropriation provision is not the sole source
of concern for critics
2 5 of Chapter 11, nor should it be the only
target for reform.

117. Beauvais, supra note 37, at 271.
118. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
FOR ECON. INJURY TO NAT'LS OF OTHER STATES

RELATIONS:

STATE RESPONSIBILITY

§ 712 cmt. g (1987).

119. Pope & Talbot Interim Award, supra note 116, 102, at 36-37.
120. Beauvais, supra note 37, at 271.
121. Pope & Talbot Interim Award, supra note 116, 96, at 33-34.
122. Id. T 104, at 38.
123. Id. at 38 n.87.
124. See Beauvais, supra note 37, at 271-72.
125. See id. at 285-87 (discussing targets for reform in NAFTA Chapter 11).
Beauvais emphasizes that "[a]rticle 1110 [Expropriation) is not the first priority
for short-term reform." Id. at 285.
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3. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. The Government of Canada.12 6
S.D. Myers, Inc., a U.S. company, brought a $20 million
NAFTA claim against Canada in October 1998 in
connection with its business of disposing PCBs.'27 The
company had established a Canadian subsidiary to export
the PCBs to the U.S. for disposal. 28 The U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency gave S.D. Myers
permission to import PCBs in 1995, but Canada
subsequently instituted an export ban.2 9 S.D. Myers
claimed that the ban violated Articles 1102 (National
Treatment), 1105 (Minimum Standard of Treatment), 1106
(Performance Requirements), and 1110 (Expropriation).130
The final decision on the merits, in November 2000, upheld
the Article 1102 and 1105 claims but denied the Article
131 S.D. Myers was awarded $3.87
1106 and 1110 claims.
132
million, plus interest.
The S.D. Myers tribunal took an even narrower view of
expropriation than the Pope & Talbot tribunal, holding that
expropriation implies a "taking" of a person's "property" for
the purpose of transferring ownership of that property to
the government or a third party. 3 ' The tribunal attempts to
distinguish an expropriation and a regulation as follows:
The general body of precedent usually does not treat regulatory
action as amounting to expropriation. Regulatory conduct by
public authorities is unlikely to be the subject of legitimate
complaint under Article 1110 of the NAFTA, although the
Tribunal does not rule out that possibility .... Expropriations tend
to involve the deprivation of ownership rights; regulations a lesser
interference. The distinction between expropriation and regulation
screens out most potential cases of complaints concerning
economic intervention by a state and reduces the risk that

126. For the various documents associated with this arbitration, see
www.naftaclaims.com (last updated Aug. 17, 2003).
127. See Final Merits Award, S.D. Myers, Inc. and Gov't of Can., 12, at 2
(Nov. 13, 2000), available at http://appletonlaw.concases (last visited Sept. 19,
2003) [hereinafter S.D. Myers Award].
128. Id. TT1 93, 111, at 16, 20.
129. Id. TT 118, 123-128, at 21, 23-27.
130. Id. TT 130-143, at 28-31.
131. Id. TT 322-323, at 80.
132. See Peter Menyasz, NAFTA Panel Awards S.D. Myers Inc. $3.87

million in Chapter 11 Case, 19 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 42, 1843 (Oct. 24, 2002).
133. See S.D. Myers Award, supra note 127, 280, at 69.
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34
governments will be subjectaffairs.
to claims
as they go about their
public
business of managing

Because the Canadian export ban was temporary and
did not transfer property to the government or other
parties, the tribunal denied the expropriation claim.'35 With
regard to the national treatment and minimum standards
of treatment claims, the tribunal upheld both while
agreeing with Pope & Talbot that discriminatory intent is
not necessary
to establish a violation of national
31 6
treatment.
D. Summary
The three cases discussed above are significant in that
each deals with a challenge to a state regulatory action, and
each has been decided by a Chapter 11 tribunal, providing
insight into how Chapter 11 is being used in practice.
Although the expropriation provision has a potentially
broad scope, in practice, the tribunals are approaching the
issue rather conservatively.'37 A separate opinion in S.D.
Myers, issued by Dr. Bryan Schwartz, one of the three
arbitrators, indicates that the arbitrators are at least aware
that Chapter 11 may be used to rollback and "chill"
environmental and safety regulation.'38 Another possible
reason for the restraint shown thus far is the need to
preserve the legitimacy of NAFTA in the United States.
NAFTA represents possibly the most controversial trade

134. Id. TT 281-282, at 69.
135. See id.
287-288, at 81.
136. Id. TT 252-256, at 62-63. In this case, the tribunal found that there was
discriminatory intent, in that Canada's export ban was in part the result of a
desire to maintain a PCB-processing industry in Canada in the future. Id. T
255, at 64. The tribunal considered this goal legitimate, but found the means illsuited, as nondiscriminatory alternatives were available. Id.
137. See Beauvais, supra note 37, at 285-86 (arguing that the expropriation
provision has not been as problematic as critics feared).
138. Dr. Schwartz, of Canada, was one of the three S.D. Myers arbitrators
(the other two arbitrators were Edward C. Chiasson of Canada and J. Martin
Hunter, Presiding Arbitrator, of England). Dr. Schwartz' separate opinion
sympathizes with the critics of NAFTA Chapter 11 but also emphasizes that
regulatory action by governments are not legitimate Article 1110 expropriation
claims. See S.D. Myers Inc. v. Can., Concurring Final Merits Award, Separate
Opinion by Dr. Bryan Schwartz, Nov. 12, 2000, TT 202-207, available at
www.appletonlaw.com/cases (last visited Oct. 24, 2003).
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legislation passed in U.S. history. 39 Outspoken critics
stirred up controversy in Congress, and the passing of
NAFTA into law was relatively close. 4 ° For those involved
in Chapter 11 arbitration, and litigation and arbitration
under the other dispute resolution provisions of NAFTA,
the need to preserve the legitimacy of NAFTA to maintain
public support may be the underlying policy of the decisions
and awards rendered thus far.14
II. SUPPORT FOR AND CRITICISM OF CHAPTER 11
Taking into consideration the substance and procedure
of Chapter 11, explained above, and the examples of cases
decided under it, following is a brief summary of the
arguments both for and against private party direct access
to dispute settlement against sovereign states in general,
and the investor-state dispute mechanism of NAFTA
Chapter 11 in particular.
A. Investor-State Dispute Settlement is a Positive Feature of
Trade Agreements
Proponents
of private party direct access to
international dispute resolution mechanisms argue that
such access is necessary to depoliticize trade relations.'42 As
a general rule, if a private party wants to challenge a trade
practice of another state, it must get its government to act
on its behalf, or espouse its claim.143 The results are often
unsatisfactory for the private party for a variety of reasons,
139. See I.M. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS 222-33 (3d ed. 1995)
(discussing the political controversy surrounding NAFTA in the broader context
of American trade politics in the twentieth century).
140. The final vote in the House of Representatives was 234 to 200, and
final affirmation in the Senate by 61 to 38. See Judith H. Bello and Alan F.
Holmer, The North American Free Trade Agreement: Its Major Provisions,
Economic Benefits, and Overarching Implications, in NAFTA: A NEW FRONTIER
IN INTERNATIONAL

TRADE

AND INVESTMENT IN THE AMERICAS

1 (Judith H. Bello et

al. eds., 1994).
141. See David Lopez, Dispute Resolution Under NAFTA: Lessons From the
Early Experience, 32 TEX. INT'L L.J. 163, 206-07 (1997) (discussing the

importance of internal domestic politics as a constraint on the NAFTA Parties
use of the various dispute resolution mechanisms in the Agreement).
142. See, e.g., Schleyer, supra note 2, at 2277; Price & Christy, supra note
48, at 167.
143. Schleyer, supra note 2, at 2296.
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such as the home government declining to raise the claim
because it may affect non-trade politics with the foreign
state, or the two nations reach an agreement that has little
to do with the initial claim."' Private parties should be
given direct access, it is argued, because they are not as
susceptible to political pressures as national governments,
and private claims would be less likely to damage
diplomatic relations between countries because they would
not represent the official position of the government.
Other proponents of private party direct access point to
the declining role of the nation state in international
economic activity and the increasing dominance of private
actors, such as multinational corporations and nongovernmental organizations.'46 The need to establish and
enforce international standards of business conduct
necessitates extending standing under international law to
private entities as against foreign state parties. 4 ' Without a
means for private actors to enforce compliance with
international rules, the credibility and legitimacy of such
rules are undermined.' 8 In the context of NAFTA, according
to one commentator, "[m]aking the governmental parties
directly accountable to those whose economic interests may
be unlawfully harmed ...

is our best assurance that

NAFTA's highest goals will be achieved."'4 9
A third argument is more pragmatic in nature.
Investor-state dispute resolution is hardly novel. There has
been a virtual explosion in Bilateral Investment Treaties
since the 1970s, and the U.S. Model BIT has included
investor-state arbitration since 1981."° NAFTA Chapter 11
is significant only to the extent that it is essentially a trilateral investment treaty contained within a free trade
agreement.' NAFTA Chapter 11 does not expand upon the
protections already afforded foreign investors in nations
with which the U.S. has a BIT in place. Furthermore, the
Chapter 11 dispute regime is a necessary "shield" to protect
144. See id. at 2297.
145. See id. at 2277.
146. See Paterson, supra note 50, at 79.
147. Id.; see also Schleyer, supra note 2, at 2293.
148. See Paterson, supra note 50, at 119.
149. Haigh, supra note 17, at 133.
150. See UNCTAD Website, supra note 38 (discussing the rapid expansion
of BITs worldwide, particularly among the developing countries).
151. See Haigh, supra note 17, at 129-30.
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foreign
15 2 investors from unfair trade policies of their host
state.
B. Investor-State Dispute Settlement is a Negative Feature of
Trade Agreements
The most prevalent criticism of Chapter 11 is that the
NAFTA Parties have eroded their national sovereignty and
ability to enact domestic laws because they are now
susceptible to challenges from foreign investors that such
regulations have injured their investments.1 53 Most of the
concern here focuses on the expansive meaning of
"expropriation." The Metalclad decision, which is to date
the only successful expropriation claim decided on the
this early fear by broadly construing
merits, exacerbated
'
"expropriation."154
Rather than serving as a means for
foreign investors to protect themselves from improper host
state action with regard to the investment, "Chapter 11 has
become a 'sword' for investors, allowing them to attack the
NAFTA countries, rather than the 'shield' it was intended
' That is, foreign investors are wielding Chapter 11
to be."155
more as an offensive weapon to attack domestic laws and
regulations that happen to affect their investment than as a
defensive protective measure to redress actual wrongs by
the host state.
Chapter 11 critics also characterize it as "a Bill of
Rights for transnational corporations, conferring on them
the right to sue host governments for enacting bona fide,
non-discriminatory public health and environmental
regulations."15'6 Furthermore, critics allege, Chapter 11
confers broad rights on multinational corporations, without
any corresponding international obligations. Finally,

152. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 25, at 528.
153. Id.; see also Tollefson, supra note 14, at 144.
154. See discussion of Metalclad, supra Part I.C.1. and text accompanying
note 110 (giving the Metalclad tribunal's definition of "expropriation").
155. Jones, supra note 25, at 528.
156. Tollefson, supra note 14, at 148 (citing STEPHEN SHRYBMAN, THE WTO:
A CITIZEN'S GUIDE 5-6 (1999)); see also Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The
Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA's Investment Protections and the Misguided
Quest for an International "RegulatoryTakings" Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30,
40-42 (2003) (discussing how NAFTA Chapter 11 creates a so-called Bill of
Rights for Investors).
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contrary to the "polluter pays" principle, Chapter
1 7 11 forces
governments to "pay polluters to stop polluting.',
Another argument against Chapter 11 focuses on the
lack of transparency of the process and the relative lack of
procedural safeguards.' 58 There is no public notification or
disclosure requirement in Chapter 11 arbitrations. 159 Civil
society critics demand more openness "to inform the public
how its money is being spent; to safeguard the fairness of
the decision-making process; and to reveal whether the
government is functioning properly."'6 °
Private participation in trade dispute resolution may
also have a negative effect on the free trade movement in
general. The enhanced negative publicity may be fueling
the free trade critics' ability to promote protectionist
ideologies. 61 This is a particularly acute concern given the
negative publicity stemming from Chapter 11 proceedings
already. In the United States, trade politics is becoming an
increasingly salient issue among lobby groups and civil
society. One need only recall the violence and voracity of
the 1999 Seattle protests against the WTO, or the difficulty
of passing NAFTA and President Clinton's subsequent
failure to receive a renewal of fast-track authority. 62 These
events should serve as an important reminder to the
negotiators of the FTAA-ignore the non-economic
consequences of free trade and investment at your peril, as
157. Tollefson, supra note 14, at 148.
158. Id. at 163.
159. Id.
160. NAFTA Panels Need More Openness, FT. WORTH STAR-TEL., Aug. 12,
2001, at 2.
161. See, e.g., Schleyer, supra note 2, at 2294-95 (discussing the various
arguments advanced against private access to the WTO, and trade dispute
mechanisms in general).
162. See, e.g., Charles Tiefer, 'Alongside" the Fast Track: Environmental
and Labor Issues in FTAA, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 329, 329-30 (1998)
(discussing the controversial nature of trade politics in Congress); Kevin C.
Kennedy, A WTO Agreement on Investment: A Solution in Search of a Problem?,
24 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 77, 185 (2003) (discussing the various causes of the
protests at the 1999 WTO Seattle Ministerial Conference); Bruner, supra note
24, at 17-18 (discussing how controversy over the inclusion of environmental
and labor issues in trade agreements resulted in President Clinton's failure to
receive a renewal of fast-track negotiating authority). Fast track authority was
renamed Trade Promotion Authority ("TPA"), and such authority was given to
President Bush in August 2002. See Gary G. Yerkey, White House Set to Press
Congress on Export Control Legislation This Fall, 19 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 32,
1374 (Aug. 8, 2002).
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trade politics and policies are no longer the "low"
163 politics of
the past, ignored by the majority of the public.
C. Investor-State Dispute Mechanisms are Inevitable in
Future Trade Agreements
Both sides of the argument represent legitimate
concerns over the process and substance of Chapter 11, and
free trade and investment regimes in general. However,
given the multitude of BITs containing similar provisions in
force, the fact that NAFTA is almost a decade old, and that
the new FTAA draft agreement already contains an
investment provision that is substantially identical to
Chapter 11, it seems that the investor-state dispute
mechanism is certain to become a permanent feature of, at
the very least, Western Hemispheric trade relations, if not
the world trading regime at large. Evidence of this trend
can be found in the recently completed United States-Chile
Free Trade Agreement ("FTA"), which provides an
investment chapter very similar to NAFTA Chapter 11,
including investor-state arbitration."' The criticisms, then,
should be considered in light of proposals to improve the
mechanism for inclusion in future trade agreements, such
as the FTAA, a topic taken up in Part V.
III. AN INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE MECHANISM IN THE FTAA
The Free Trade Area of the Americas negotiations are
currently underway, with the expectation that negotiations
will conclude by 2005.16 Thus far, the negotiations can be
163. Indeed, according to one observer, "[p]olls consistently showed that the
vast majority of Americans opposed NAFTA and the negotiation of any new
deals that the public linked with globalization, the loss of U.S. jobs, the decline
of wages, and a lower living standard." Michael C. McClintock, Sunrise Mexico;
Sunset NAFTA-Centric FTAA-What Next and Why?, 7 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 1,

7 (2000).
164. The Office for the United States Trade Representative ("USTR") has
made the final text of the U.S.-Chile FTA available on its website, at
http://www.ustr.gov/new/fta/Chile/text (last visited Sept. 22, 2003) [hereinafter
US-Chile FTA]. The U.S.-Chile FTA passed the House of Representatives by a
wide margin, 270 to 156, on July 23, 2003. See Statement of USTR Robert B.
Zoellick Following House Approval of Chile and Singapore Free Trade
Agreements (July 23, 2003), available at http://www.ustr.gov/releases
/2003/07/2003-07-23-rbz-statement.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2003).
165. See Bruner, supra note 24, at 7.
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characterized as a bargaining process between the trading
blocs led by the U.S., for NAFTA, and Brazil, for the
Southern Common Market ("Mercado Comun del Sur" or
"MERCOSUR"), as each attempts to gain the upper hand. 6 '
MERCOSUR and NAFTA are dissimilar trade agreements
in a number of ways.1 7 For example, MERCOSUR creates a
customs union for Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and
Uruguay, and it has Economic Complementation
Agreements with Mexico, Chile, Bolivia, and the Andean
Community, while NAFTA is a less comprehensive free
trade agreement among the United States, Mexico and
Canada.68 Furthermore, when compared with MERCOSUR,
NAFTA dispute resolution is a relatively transparent
process.'69 Thus, the status of investor-state arbitration
under MERCOSUR is somewhat unclear, although it does
appear that MERCOSUR provides for such dispute
resolution following unsuccessful consultations. 7 '
The second draft text of the FTAA, released in
November 2002, includes an investment chapter similar to
that contained in NAFTA."' However, much of the Chapter
166. Id. at 6. The FTAA negotiating principles allow countries to negotiate
individually or as members of a sub-regional bloc. Brazil championed this as a
means for economically less powerful nations to increase their bargaining
power, and thus MERCOSUR, of which Brazil is the largest nation, has chosen
to negotiate as a bloc. See id. at 6-7. For a discussion of the difficulties facing
the integration of MERCOSUR (a Latin American customs union composed of
Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay) and NAFTA (a free trade
agreement) see Gilmore, supra note 21.
167. For an extensive comparison of the NAFTA and MERCOSUR regimes,
see David Lopez, Dispute Resolution Under MERCOSUR from 1991 to 1996:
Implications for the Formation of a Free Trade Area of the Americas, NAFTA: L.
& Bus. REV. AM., Spring 1997, at 3.
168. In free trade areas, members remove internal tariffs but maintain
individual external tariffs vis-A-vis non-FTA countries, while a customs union is
a free trade area plus the members adopt a common external tariff.
MERCOSUR aspires to eventually become a common market, which is a
customs union that has also eliminated all barriers to the free movement of the
factors of production among the participating states. See, e.g., McClintock,
supra note 163, at 46-47; Bruner, supra note 24, at 28.
169. See Lopez, supra note 167, at 27.
170. See David A. Gantz, The United States and the Expansion of Western
Hemisphere Free Trade: Participantor Observer?, 14 ARiZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
381, 403 n. 140 (1997) (stating that MERCOSUR does not provide for investorstate arbitration to the same extent as NAFTA Chapter Eleven); but see BHALA
& KENNEDY, supra note 43, at 246 (apparently acknowledging a mechanism
similar to NAFTA Chapter Eleven in MERCOSUR).
171. FTAA Draft, supra note 23.
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remains open for negotiation, as almost every provision
contained therein is still in brackets.
The following
discussion provides a general overview of several issues
that are important in considering an investor-state dispute
mechanism in the FTAA. Besides the practicalities of
completing such a large-scale investment agreement, there
are several issues that are particular to Latin America,
principally the historical dominance of the Calvo Doctrine
and the increasing
salience
of Latin American
environmental politics and protection.
A. The Calvo Doctrine in Latin America
As discussed in relation to Mexico, above, the Calvo
Doctrine has traditionally been espoused by Latin
American countries in response to diplomatic intervention
of foreign governments on behalf of their own nationals in
disputes with host countries.'73 The main goal of the
doctrine was to put the foreign investor in the same position
as a national investor of the host country.'74 The exclusive
remedy for foreign investors was the domestic court system
of the host.'75
Latin America has undergone something of a paradigm
shift in recent years, and by the 1990s had clearly moved
away from import substitution models of development and
toward export-led growth strategies.'76 Although levels of
foreign investment and receptivity to it in Latin America
have fluctuated over the years, this shift in development
strategies has spurred the desire to attract more and more
foreign direct investment ("FDI"), to bring much-needed
currency into the countries to fund economic growth and
import new technology.'
Yet, capital-exporting nations
were reluctant to heavily invest in Latin America for a

172. When governments negotiate an agreement, they place any language
that has not been definitely accepted by all negotiators in brackets. C. O'Neal
Taylor, The Future of InternationalEconomic Dispute Resolution in the Western
Hemisphere (Dispute Settlement in the FTAA), 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1267
(2001).
173. See BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 43, at 186.
174. Id.
175. See id.
176. See Manning-Cabrol, supra note 40, at 1194.
177. See Edward A. Fallone, Latin American Laws Regulating Foreign
Investment, SB04 ALI-ABA 325, 327 (July 8, 1996).
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number of reasons, among them the use of so-called Calvo
Clauses in foreign investment contracts, which limit
dispute resolution to the host country's domestic courts,
fears of currency fluctuations, restrictive foreign investment
laws, and a history of nationalizing foreign entities with
less-than-adequate compensation. 78
Along with the desire to attract foreign investment, the
decreasing role of the nation state in international economic
relations and the emergence of international standards of
treatment are also driving the abandonment of the Calvo
Doctrine. 179 According to one observer, the Calvo Doctrine

has always strived for equality between nationals and
foreigners-and now, most international investment
regimes contain an equality standard of treatment
provision (so-called "national treatment"). 80 Thus, the Calvo
Doctrine has become superfluous in this new world order.18
The abandonment of the Calvo Doctrine in Latin
America is evident in several ways. First, arbitration is
increasingly common in Latin America, where it was once
rejected and rarely used.'82 When the ICSID Convention
was signed in 1964, not a single Latin American country
ratified it.' 8' Although Jamaica ratified it in 1966, Trinidad
and Tobago in 1967, and Guyana in 1969, signature and
ratification really gained momentum in the mid-1980s and
continues to this day. For example, Guatemala just recently
ratified the Convention on January 21, 2003.8 Today,
among the thirty-four countries that are negotiating the
FTAA, twenty-three have ratified ICSID, l1 5 three countries
178. See id. at 326-27, 330-31.
179. See Manning-Cabrol, supra note 40, at 1180 (discussing the new world
order where supranational organizations and individuals play an increasing
role, and international standards of treatment decrease the need for diplomatic
protection by home countries).
180. See id. at 1195.
181. Id. at 1198.
182. Id. at 1184.
183. See Christopher K. Dalrymple, Politics and Foreign Direct Investment:
The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency and the Calvo Clause, 29
CORNELL INT'L L.J.

161, 186 (1996).

184. See The World Bank Group's ICSID Website, List of ContractingStates
and other Signatories of the Convention, at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/
constate/c-states-en.htm (last updated Mar. 6, 2003) [hereinafter ICSID
Website].
185. Argentina, the Bahamas, Barbados, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica,
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, Trinidad
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are signatories, 116 and only eight
countries have no
7
affiliation with ICSID whatsoever. 1
Second, the U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty program
with Latin America undoubtedly contributed to the demise
of the Calvo Doctrine, beginning in the early to mid-1980s
when BITs began to almost universally provide for investorstate arbitration. The first U.S. BIT with a Latin American
country was signed with Panama on October 27, 1982.188
The United States has since negotiated BITs with
Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Grenada, Haiti18
Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, and Trinidad and Tobago. a
Mexico effectively abandoned the Calvo Doctrine by
adopting its 1993 Foreign Investment Law, which brought
Mexico into conformity with NAFTA. 19° Similarly, Peru
abandoned the Calvo Doctrine in its 1993 Constitution, by
providing that controversies arising between a foreign
investor and the government of Peru may be submitted to
international arbitration rather than Peruvian domestic
courts.' 9
In sum, the Calvo Doctrine may have, in the recent
past, posed a formidable obstacle to including investor-state
arbitration in the FTAA. However, a number of political
forces have slowly eroded the necessity of Calvo Clause
protections in Latin America. Furthermore, the desire of
attracting foreign investment in Latin America is
motivating the shift toward acceptance of investor-state
dispute mechanisms as well as the acceptance of the
substantive protections afforded by investment treaties.

and Tobago, United States, Uruguay and Venezuela have all ratified the
Convention. See id.
186. The signatory-only countries are Belize, Dominican Republic, and
Haiti. See id.
187. Antigua and Barbuda, Brazil, Canada, Dominica, Guyana, Mexico, St.
Vincent and the Grenadines, and Suriname. See id.
188. Treaty Concerning the Treatment and Protection of Investments, Oct.
27, 1982, U.S.-Pan., S. TREATY DOc. 99-14.
189. The FTAA Website maintains a list of all Bilateral Investment Treaties
(BITs) that the FTAA members have signed, Free Trade Area of the AmericasFTAA Bilateral Investment Treaties, at http://www.alca-ftaa.orgcpbits/
english99/listagrs.asp#Bilateral%2OInvestment%2OTreaties (last visited Oct. 1,
2003).
190. See Fallone, supra note 177, at 336 (noting that without NAFTA
dispute resolution procedures, Mexican law required foreign investors to sign
so-called Calvo Clauses).
191. See id. at 338.
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However, as Brazil is the major player in the FTAA
negotiations for Latin America, and Brazil is one of the few
countries that is not associated with ICSID or in a BIT with
the United States, it is possible that Brazil may be less
willing to abandon the Calvo Doctrine as some of her
neighbors. MERCOSUR currently does not provide for
binding investor-state arbitration without the investor first
seeking consultations, and its investment provisions are
decidedly less comprehensive than those of NAFTA.19' Until
recently, Chile seemed similarly attached to Calvo
principles, and with the United States' failure to negotiate
Chile's accession to NAFTA and Chile's subsequent
association with MERCOSUR, it appeared Chile would
remain that way for some time.' An encouraging sign
emerged very recently, however, with the United States and
Chile entering into a bilateral Free Trade Agreement,
which provides investment protection and investor-state
arbitration similar to NAFTA Chapter 11.' Whether the
remaining Latin American countries similarly still attached
to Calvo principles will eventually follow suit, especially in
investment agreements with non-Latin American countries,
remains unknown. Yet, it is difficult to envision the United
States accepting the FTAA without an investor-state
arbitration mechanism. Thus, this issue may present a
major stumbling block in the FTAA negotiations as
controversy continues to rise over the merits of investorstate arbitration.
B. EnvironmentalPolitics in Latin America
The strongest criticism of Chapter 11 is that foreign
investors use it to challenge legitimate national
environmental regulations on the grounds that they are

192. See Gantz, supra note 170, at 403-04 (discussing the problems
associated with merging NAFTA and MERCOSUR into the FTAA).
193. Fallone, supra note 177, at 334-35 (discussing dispute resolution under
Chile's Foreign Investment Law as recently as 1996, which essentially followed
the Calvo Doctrine model of providing exclusively for local remedies). Chile was
slated, at one point, to become the fourth NAFTA Party, indicating its
willingness to adhere to Chapter 11 and abandon the Calvo Doctrine as Mexico
did. See McClintock, supra note 163, at 3-6 (discussing how the President's
failure to receive fast-track negotiating authority made it impossible to
negotiate the terms of Chile's accession into NAFTA).
194. See U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 164.
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"tantamount to expropriation" of their investment. The
Metalclad decision
exacerbated
this
fear
among
environmentalists and other civil society critics when it
awarded almost $17 million in damages in connection with
the investor's hazardous waste facility in Mexico.19 Indeed,
a significant number of the cases brought under Chapter 11
thus far deal with environmental regulation, public health,
or resource management policies. 9 ' Many environmentalists oppose the inclusion of an investor-state dispute
mechanism in the FTAA for fear that it will be used to
challenge environmental and public health laws of those
governments. 97' Interestingly, it is also for this reason that
Canadian trade ministers have demonstrated eroding
support for investor-state dispute settlement, saying that
they will not ratify the FTAA if it includes a provision
similar to NAFTA Chapter 11.198
Although Latin America has abundant natural
resources, it has traditionally allowed exploitation of those
resources as a means to economic development. "As a result
of this relentless drive to develop, [the region] acquired not
only a reputation as a haven for environmentally negligent
industries, but also a host of environmental problems that
' Yet
threaten the region's biodiversity and human health."199
recently, and in response to two complementary sources of
pressure-growing concern from Latin American citizens
and environmental NGOs and increasing widespread
awareness of the environmental side effects associated with
increased international trade-many Latin American
countries have adopted much stronger environmental
laws.2 °° Many international environmental and development
organizations see this as a step in the right direction for
Latin America, as countries find new ways to develop
195. See Harbine, supra note 112, at 372-73.
196. According to one earlier observer, of the eighteen claims filed at the
time of his writing, eleven had dealt with at least one of these issues. See
Tollefson, supra note 14, at 149.
197. See Jessica M. Johnson, The Free Trade in the Americas Agreement:
Free Trade or Export of Environmental Problems?, 2001 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L
& POL'Y 71, 74 (2001) (citing opposition to the inclusion of Chapter 11 in FTAA
from environmental groups such as the Sierra Club and Friends of the Earth).
198. See The Canadian Press, Summit-Environment-Chapter 11 (Apr. 15,
2001), available at 2001 WL 18827690.
199. Armin Rosencranz et al., Rio Plus Five: Environmental Protection and
Free Trade in Latin America, 9 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 527, 527 (1997).
200. See id. at 528.
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economically while also taking steps to protect their
environment and natural resources. °1 But the fact remains
that many of Latin America's national environmental
regulations, and especially the enforcement thereof, are still
below the standards of the NAFTA Parties. °2
The lower environmental standards in Latin America
raise some important issues. The most significant is how to
prevent the lower standards from creating a foreign
investment "race to the bottom." Those countries with less
strict environmental laws make doing business there less
costly,2 3 and many Latin American countries have decided
to maintain the lower standards in order to attract
investment. °4
This race to the bottom was also an issue when the
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement 5 ("CUSFTA") was
extended to Mexico and NAFTA was created. As a result of
political pressure in the United States, the newly elected
Clinton Administration negotiated supplementary labor
and environment "side agreements" to dispel fears of
lenient regulations and enforcement in Mexico. 0 " To the
United States, the inclusion of the side agreements was a
political necessity, "to allay the primary American suspicion
of the agreement prior to its adoption: that lax standards
south of the border would prompt industry to save money7
on environmental compliance by relocating to such areas."00
Such side agreements may again become necessary to the
NAFTA Parties in the process of negotiating the FTAA,
especially to Mexico, which had to improve its enforcement
of environmental laws when NAFTA came into force, and
will not want to "lose" foreign investment to those Latin
American countries with lower standards and lax
201. See id. at 579.
202. See Russel M. Lazega, NAFTA Accession and Environmental
Protection:The Prospects for an "EarthFriendly"Integration of Latin American
Nations into the North American Trading Bloc, 5 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 315,
331 (1996).
203. Id. at 332.
204. Id.
205. Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can., 27 I.L.M.
281.
206. The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
(NAAEC), U.S.-Can.-Mex., Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480; North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), U.S.-Can.-Mex., Sept. 14, 1993, 32
I.L.M. 1499.
207. Rosencranz, supra note 199, at 539.
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enforcement. But whether the Latin American countries
will be willing to agree to such provisions is doubtful, as
they are likely to view such requirements as an
infringement on their national sovereignty. 8 and their
ability to compete internationally. 09
In summary, Latin American integration into the FTAA
faces at least two significant challenges with regard to
environmental issues. First, the use of Chapter 11-like
investor-state arbitration should be a source of concern for
those who do not wish to see Latin American environmental
regulations "chilled" or even clawed back. The newly
developing environmental awareness in some Latin
American countries is a step in the right direction for these
countries, and concern that investor-state arbitration will
have a negative impact on new environmental regulation is
well-founded. For example, according to author Howard
Mann of the International Institute for Sustainable
Development, between 1994, when NAFTA came into force,
and 2001, the Canadian government enacted only two new
environmental
regulations, and both have been
challenged.210 Second, the goal of attracting foreign
investment in Latin America may cause some countries to
resist increasing environmental enforcement standards,21'
and thus a mechanism similar to the environmental side
agreement of NAFTA may be necessary to both level the
playing field and promote sustainable development. The
tension between the promotion of free trade and investment
on the one hand, and environmental protection on the
other, is likely to generate heated controversy as the
negotiations for the FTAA conclude and the ratification
process commences.

208. See Lazega, supra note 202, at 331-32 (noting that Latin America may
perceive U.S.-imposed environmental standards as an attempt at cultural
imperialism and domination).
209. See id. at 332-33 (citing the reluctance of many Latin American
countries to limit their competitive advantage in "low wages and regulatory
costs and ... natural resources" by agreeing to be bound by U.S. environmental
standards).
210. See Summit-Environment-Chapter11, supra note 198.
211. See J. Martin Wagner, International Investment, Expropriation and
EnvironmentalProtection, 29 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 465, 469-70 (1999).
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C. A MultilateralAgreement on Investment
No discussion of investment treaties and investor
protections would be complete without at least a brief
consideration of the difficulty of negotiating a multilateral
treaty that includes investment provisions. A comprehensive multilateral treaty on foreign investment currently
does not exist. 12 NAFTA contains a comprehensive
investment chapter, but it only covers three countries,
while the Trade Related Aspects of Investment Measures
("TRIMs") Agreement applies to every member state of the
WTO, but it creates only minimal obligations. "One major
reason for the difficulty in establishing an international
treaty on investments has been the great difficulty in
striking a compromise between industrialized nations' [sic]
desire for security of their investments and developing
'
nations' desire for flexibility."213
In 1995, the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development began negotiating the Multilateral
Agreement in Investment, which would be a comprehensive
investment treaty containing an investor-state dispute
mechanism among the twenty-nine members, most of which
are developed countries.214 The MAI Negotiating Text
revealed that its provisions were essentially identical to
NAFTA Chapter 11.2" Thus, it was susceptible to many of
the same criticisms levied at Chapter 11, especially with
respect to environmental protection and sovereignty. Yet
the MAI was even broader than Chapter 11. Specifically, it
potentially applied to both portfolio investments and foreign
direct investment." This would effectively have extended
the benefits of the MAI and its investor-state dispute
mechanism to investors from non-OECD countries, because
non-OECD investors would be able to establish shell
corporations in MAI member countries to take advantage of
MAI benefits. 21 7' Essentially, almost any corporation in the

Baker, supra note 20, at 340.
Id.
Wagner, supra note 211, at 481.
Id. at 483.
216. See Mark Vallianatos, De-Fangingthe MAI,31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 713,
714 (1998).
217. Id. at 714-15.
212.
213.
214.
215.
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world would have legal standing under the MAI ?regardless
of whether their home country is an MAI Party."
Another significant problem with the MAI had to do
with the nature of the negotiating parties. The OECD is
dominated by the wealthiest of nations, meaning the MAI
focused mostly on the concerns of multinational
corporations, rather than the concerns of the developing
nations that host investment. 219 Two major problems arose
during the MAI negotiations: (1) disputes among the
negotiating states, particularly the United States, Canada
and the European Union, over exemptions from MAI
provisions for cultural industries and preferential trade
agreements, and (2) an aggressive campaign against the
MAI by an international coalition of NGOs, opposed to the
MAI on similar grounds to those given for opposing NAFTA
Chapter 11, specifically the environmental and other
negative consequences
of economic
globalization.22 °
Ultimately these troubles overwhelmed the negotiations:
the MAI was a failure, and in October 1998, the
negotiations were abandoned as a result of concerns that
the agreement would negatively affect national sovereignty,
labor rights and the environment. 2 '
The Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations, which
resulted in the creation of the World Trade Organization in
1995, managed to reach a minimal agreement on TRIMs,22
to which all WTO members are obligated, albeit to varying
degrees. 23 TRIMs requires national treatment, and lists
certain actions that are inconsistent with this principle,
such as performance requirements. 4 It also allowed
developing countries to "deviate temporarily" from the
national treatment obligation, which diminished the
218. Id. at 715.
219. See Jurgen Kurtz, A General Investment Agreement in the WTO?
Lessons From Chapter 11 of NAFTA and the OECD MultilateralAgreement on
Investment, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 713, 714 (2002).

220. Id. at 758-59.
221. See id. at 761; Wagner, supra note 211, at 481.
222. See Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, reprinted in
Uruguay Round Trade Agreements, Statement of Administrative Action 1, H.R.
Doc. 316, 103d Cong., 1448 (1994) [hereinafter TRIMs Agreement].
223. See Kennedy, supra note 162, at 135-39 (summarizing the provisions of
the TRIMs Agreement).
224. Id. at 136. Article 2.2 of the TRIMs Agreement provides an illustrative
list of the TRIMs that are inconsistent with the GATT 1994. See TRIMs
Agreement, supra note 222, art. 2.2, at 1448.
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effectiveness of the agreement. 2 ' Furthermore, the dispute
settlement provision of TRIMs is similar to the rest of the
WTO, in that it is strictly a state-state dispute mechanism,
and private parties, including investors, have no
standing.226 In light of this, the NAFTA provisions are much
more comprehensive, although limited, of course, to the
three NAFTA Parties.
The FTAA will be composed of not only two of the most
developed countries in the world, the United States and
Canada, but also several of the least developed countries. In
addition, it will encompass thirty-four separate states,
whereas current investment treaties involve far fewer-BITs
involve only two countries and NAFTA involves only three.
It remains to be seen whether the scale of the FTAA or the
disparity in development among its negotiating parties will
affect the negotiation of the investment provision. If the
MAI and TRIMs agreements are any indication, the
prospects are not overwhelmingly optimistic.
IV. IMPROVING THE INVESTOR-STATE PROVISIONS OF
AND FOR FUTURE AGREEMENTS

NAFTA

As we have seen, NAFTA Chapter 11 is a source of
controversy in the debate over the merits of liberal trade
and investment. Some argue that it is an assault on state
sovereignty and that it chills the ability of democratic
governments to protect public health and the environment
within their own territory.227 Others argue that in this
modern era, where private actors are increasingly dominant
in international economic relations, a mechanism whereby
private parties can resolve disputes against states is a
welcome innovation.228 Regardless of the merits of either
argument, one thing seems certain-the investor-state
dispute mechanism is here to stay. It is a feature of
225. See Kennedy, supra note 162, at 138 (observing that while the
developed countries must eliminate any inconsistent TRIMs within two years,
the developing countries have five years and the least-developed countries have
seven years to do so).
226. See Kurtz, supra note 219, at 787 (discussing the unlikely possibility
that WTO negotiators will include an investor-state dispute settlement
procedure similar to NAFTA Chapter 11 in a WTO agreement).
227. For further discussion of these criticisms see, for example, Jones, supra
note 25, at 545.
228. See, e.g., Paterson, supra note 50, at 79.
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NAFTA, which has been in force for nearly a decade.229 The
ICSID has been in existence since 1966."0 There are over
2000 Bilateral Investment Treaties in force worldwide,
most of which provide for investor-state arbitration.231 The
likelihood that investor-state arbitration will be incorporated into the FTAA is high-the November 2002 draft text
already contains such a provision.232 Furthermore, the
United States is adamant that investor-state arbitration be
included in the FTAA.233
Given this probability, it is nevertheless important to
consider how the investment provisions of NAFTA Chapter
11 can be improved, both for NAFTA itself and for inclusion
in the FTAA. Only by learning from past mistakes can we
avoid repeating them. As the FTAA will be the largest
regional trading bloc in the world, the negotiating parties
must be careful not to become "Frankenstein."2' 14 Therefore,
the foregoing critique should serve as an impetus to refine
the investment provisions of Chapter 11, and suggestions
on how to do so are already emerging from the literature on
this subject. These suggestions can be grouped into four
general categories-Definitional, Procedural, Institutional,
and Environmental.
A. Narrow and Explicit Definitions
Many of the terms used in NAFTA Chapter 11 are
either broadly defined or not defined at all and thus subject
to ambiguity. Among the most significant of these are
"expropriation," "measure," and "national treatment." As
one commentator put it, "[nio one is exactly sure what a
'measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation'

229. NAFTA came into force in the United States in January, 1994. See 19
U.S.C. § 3311(b).
230. For more information about the purpose and structure of ICSID, a
World Bank Agency, see their website, at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid (last
visited Oct. 10, 2003).
231. UNCTAD Website, supra note 38.
232. See FTAA Draft, supra note 23.
233. Proposed Investor-State Provision in FTAA Opposed, 18 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 479 (March 22, 2001).
234. See Haigh, supra note 17, at 125 (citing the Random House Dictionary
definition of Frankenstein as ". . . a person who creates a monster or destructive
agency that he cannot control or that brings about his own ruin").
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really means, and.., no one can be sure what the limits to
'national treatment' will be."235
'
With respect to expropriation, we have seen that early
Chapter 11 tribunals have in practice interpreted the term
conservatively, limiting its scope to the customary
international law definition of expropriation, and nothing
more."6 In addition, these tribunals have interpreted the
customary international law standard of expropriation as
requiring substantial or complete deprivation of economic
use of the investment.237 However, although the expropriation provision has not in fact created the problems its critics
feared, it is still advisable that the NAFTA trade ministers,
and the FTAA negotiators, attempt to incorporate the
tribunals' early decisions on this issue into the agreement
itself, as the decisions are currently not binding on future
tribunals.23

Similarly, the term "measure" is overbroadly defined to
include "any law, regulation, procedure, requirement or
practice" of a host government. 3 A "measure tantamount to
expropriation," then, could be any government measure
enacted for a legitimate purpose as part of the host state's
police powers. A measure may even be a governmental
statement of intention to introduce legislation, which
essentially allows foreign corporations from another Party
to influence the passage of legislation that would otherwise
be legitimate behavior for sovereign governments to
pursue."' To limit what "measures" can be challenged by an
investor, tribunals should consider not whether the effects
of the measure are expropriatory, but whether the host
state purpose was expropriatory or a legitimate exercise of

235. Jones, supra note 25, at 553.
236. See Beauvais, supra note 37, at 285.
237. Id.
238. See NAFTA, supra note 22, art. 1136.
239. Id. art. 201(1).
240. See Haigh, supra note 17, at 125; see also Ethyl Corp. v. Can., 38 I.L.M.
708 (1998). In Ethyl, a U.S. investor submitted a Notice of Arbitration while the
legislation that it wished to challenge as a "measure tantamount to
expropriation" was still pending. Id. at 725. The tribunal held that Canada's
jurisdictional objections, based on Ethyl having "jumped the gun" by filing
before there was even a measure within the meaning of article 1101, was
nevertheless moot because the legislation had in fact been signed into law by
the time the tribunal was hearing the case, a fact that Canada itself conceded.
Id. at 726.
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its police powers.24' Furthermore, measures should be
limited to those actually enacted, and not merely proposals,
to avoid interference with the legislative policy-making
process.
The national treatment and minimum standard of
treatment claims have, on the whole, been more prevalent
than the expropriation claims.242 The problem is that
virtually any economic injury, regardless of substantiality,
is compensable.243 The Pope & Talbot tribunal held that,
with respect to a breach of the national treatment
requirement, although discriminatory intent is relevant, it
is not necessary.244 "[T]he provisions function as a general
equitable redress of alleged wrongs against investors., 245 A
pending Chapter 11 claim underscores the problems
associated with the national treatment and minimum
standard of treatment provisions. In October 1998, the
Loewen Group, a Canadian company, brought a $725
million claim against the United States.24 The claim
alleged, among other things, that the $400 million in
punitive damages that a Mississippi jury awarded Loewen's
former business partner in a $5 million contractual dispute
was "tantamount to expropriation," a violation of Article
1110, and that it was not afforded national treatment in the
U.S. courts, as required by Article 1102.247 In addition to
this jury award, Mississippi state law requires a bond of
125 percent of the judgment to stay the judgment pending
appeal, which Loewen was unable to afford.24 ' Loewen
settled the suit with its former U.S. business partner for
$175 million, and then sued the United States for $725
million, arguing that this "coerced" settlement amounted to
an expropriation within NAFTA Article 1110.249 The
preliminary award on jurisdiction rejected the United
States argument that a judicial decision cannot be a
241. See Paterson, supra note 50, at 104.
242. See Beauvais, supra note 37, at 285-86.
243. Id. at 286.
244. Id. at 274.
245. Id. at 286.
246. Notice of Claim, Loewen Group, Inc. v. U.S. (ICSID Additional
Facility), Oct. 30, 1998, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/3922.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2003).
247. Been & Beauvais, supra note 156, at 68, 82 (discussing the claim in
Loewen).
248. Id. at 82.
249. Id.
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measure of expropriation under Chapter 11.250 The
administration of justice in national courts is considered a
governmental measure, which is evidently within the scope
of Chapter 11! The NAFTA Parties themselves are palpably
concerned with the scope of the minimum standards of
treatment provision, Article 1105. Following the Pope &
Talbot decision, the NAFTA Free Trade Commission issued
the first interpretive statement, binding upon future
Chapter 11 tribunals, limiting the Article 1105 minimum
treatment requirement to the standards of protection
provided
by customary international law, and nothing
251
more.
Perhaps the best way in dealing with these definitional
issues is through amendments to the Chapter 11
substantive rights and definitions. However, this is unlikely
to occur in the foreseeable future, and therefore, the
NAFTA Parties should adopt more substantive interpretive
statements to define the limits of expropriation, measures,
and nationals treatment.1 2 Presently, the interpretive
statement issued after Pope & Talbot remains the sole
clarification to Chapter 11 offered by the Free Trade
Commission. Because such interpretations are binding on
future Chapter 11 tribunals, they could be of significant
value in addressing several definitional aspects of the
Chapter.253 The FTAA negotiating ministers are well
advised to take these definitional issues into consideration
in drafting the new agreement, in an attempt to learn from
NAFTA and build on it as a foundation.

250. Loewen Group, Inc. v. U.S., Decision on Hearing of Respondent's
Objection to Competence and Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, 49
(Jan. 5, 2001), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organizations/
3921.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2003). The case was finally dismissed in its
entirety by the tribunal on June 26, 2003, with the tribunal concluding that
"Loewen had failed to demonstrate a violation of NAFTA, because the company
had failed to pursue other remedies available to it under U.S. law." Press
Release, Department of Justice, International Tribunal Unanimously Finds for
the United States in North American Free Trade Agreement Case (June 26,
2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/June/ 03_civ_389.htm (last
visited Oct. 24, 2003).
251. Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions (NAFTA Free
Trade Commission, July 31, 2001), available at http://dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tnanac/NAFTA-Interpr-en.asp (last updated Dec. 12, 2002).
252. See Beauvais, supra note 37, at 288-95 (illustrating a number of
proposed statements and offering guidance to would-be drafters).
253. NAFTA, supra note 22, art. 1131(2).
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B. ProceduralImprovements
Improving the procedural problems associated with
Chapter 11 may be even more beneficial than clarifying the
scope of substantive rights in that such changes can
increase the legitimacy of the mechanism, a step toward
improving public relations in the realm of trade politics.254
This should be a central concern of both the NAFTA Parties
and the negotiators of the FTAA, as public support is
necessary to sustain the liberal trade and investment
regime that will eventually encompass almost the entire
Western Hemisphere.
Most of the procedural suggestions focus on
establishing open, transparent proceedings. Currently,
arbitrations are closed to the public and there is no
publication requirement. 5
"Chapter 11 encourages
governments to litigate public interest issues in a secretive
process in which the interests of only one party are
25 Recently, U.S. and Canadian
presented and considered.""
NGOs have sought amicus status in Chapter 11
proceedings.5 7 The NGOs wanted the right to observe the
proceedings and to make oral and written submissions to
the tribunals concerning the policy issue raised in the
case."' Eventually, the U.S. and Canadian governments
supported amicus submissions in Chapter 11 arbitrations.259
Canada was motivated by the desire for greater
transparency in the process, while the U.S. argued that
amicus submissions should be permitted as a general rule
where they are likely to help the tribunal.2 "' This represents
an important first step in making the Chapter 11 investorstate mechanism more transparent and accountable.
254. See Jones, supra note 25, at 549-50.
255. Id. at 548.
256. Lucien J. Dhooge, The Revenge of the Trail Smelter: Environmental
Regulation as Expropriation Pursuant to the North American Free Trade
Agreement, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 475, 546 (2001).
257. See Tollefson, supra note 14, at 164.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. Note also that the United States argued successfully at the WTO for
the admission of amicus curiae briefs where they are likely to help the
Appellate Body resolve state-state trade disputes. This is especially significant
because prior to this, non-state actors had no direct voice at the WTO. Report of
the Panel on United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, 2001 WL 671012, WT/DS58/RW,at 11-13 (June 15, 2001).
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Another approach to improving the investor-state
dispute mechanism is to establish a preliminary review of
cases coupled with the threat of sanctions against a party
who brings a frivolous or meritless lawsuit.61 This would
have the added benefit of preventing U.S. and Canadian
investors from abusing the mechanism and using it as a
threat to induce the weaker Mexican government to alter
its practice in order to avoid costly arbitration.262 The same
argument applies to curbing the abuse of the mechanism by
U.S. investors against Canada, as we've already witnessed
successful
claims
against
the
Canadian
several
government, as well as at least one instance where
Canadian lawmakers withdrew from enacting legislation in
response to a Chapter 11 arbitration claim from a U.S.
investor.263 A second suggestion is to require preliminary
home governmental approval of Chapter 11 claims that
challenge important public policies.264
These procedural improvements of Chapter 11 may be
among the simplest to adopt, or to incorporate into the
FTAA. However, one must consider these procedural
changes in light of the arguments made by supporters of
investor-state arbitration, and Chapter 11 proceedings in
particular. Instituting prohibitive access barriers to the
mechanism runs the risk of depriving private parties of
direct access, and returning to the days of pure state-state
resolution of trade and investment disputes. This outcome
would essentially "throw the baby out with the bath
water,"65' and bring us right back to where we started,
261. See Jones, supra note 25, at 546.
262. See id.
263. S.D. Myers Inc. v. Can. (UNCITRAL), Nov. 13, 2000, available at
www.naftaclaims.com (last updated Aug. 17, 2003) (the U.S. investor was
awarded $3.87 million USD); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Can. (UNCITRAL), April
10, 2001 available at www.naftaclaims.com (last updated Aug. 17, 2003)
(partial award to U.S. investor). In Ethyl Corp. v. Can., 38 I.L.M. 708 (1998), a
U.S. investor used Chapter 11 arbitration to influence the Canadian
government not to pass legislation that would have interfered with the
investor's investment. The Chapter 11 claim was subsequently withdrawn and
the parties settled, with Canada paying Ethyl $13 million for costs and lost
profits while the Act was in place. See HOWARD MANN, PRIVATE RIGHTS, PUBLIC
PROBLEMS:

A

GUIDE TO

NAFTA's

CONTROVERSIAL CHAPTER ON INVESTOR RIGHTS

72-73 (Int'l Inst. for Sustainable Dev., 2001), available at http://www.iisd.org
(last visited Aug. 21, 2003).
264. See Dhooge, supra note 256, at 553.
265. See Francisco S. Nogales, The NAFTA Environmental Framework,
Chapter 11 Investment Provisions, and the Environment, 8 ANN. SURV. INT'L &
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abandoning all the reasons an investor-state dispute
mechanism was created in the first place. Change and
modification should be tempered by recalling the purpose of
the mechanism in the first place.
C. InstitutionalEnhancements
Institutionally, NAFTA is relatively bare bones when
compared with the WTO or the European Union. NAFTA
tribunals are established on an ad-hoc basis, and there is
not currently an appellate procedure for NAFTA
decisions.266 To that end, the creation of a body to interpret
and apply NAFTA law, and hear appeals from the various
dispute resolution mechanisms, including Chapter 11,
would provide consistency and stability to the NAFTA
dispute process. FTAA negotiators may want to establish a
body, akin to the WTO Standing Appellate Body, from
FTAA's inception.
As a corollary to the establishment of a standing body,
the NAFTA Parties and FTAA negotiators may wish to
modify NAFTA Article 1136(1) to make tribunal decisions
binding, or at least persuasive on future tribunals.267 This
would have beneficial consequences for stability and would
also begin to establish a body of jurisprudence that
governments and investors alike could use to help them
make decisions. Doing so will also likely discourage
investors from bringing claims that are substantially
similar to those that a Chapter 11 tribunal has already
declined. And as early tribunal decisions have been less
favorable to investors than the Chapter's critics had feared,
this may further encourage public confidence in the regime
and enhance its legitimacy.
Finally, an open, transparent reporting requirement
would also contribute significantly toward improving the
transparency of the system. Any non-confidential material
relating to NAFTA Chapter 19 and Chapter 20 proceedings,
including the status of cases, is made available to any

COMP. L. 97, 141 (2002) (describing abandoning the investor-state mechanism
as amounting to "throwing the baby out with the bath water," because less
dramatic steps can be taken to improve it).
266. See Gal-Or, supra note 6, at 5-8 (discussing the "institutional
meagerness" of NAFTA).
267. See Haigh, supra note 17, at 133.

2003]

LESSONS FROM NAFTA

1191

interested party by the NAFTA Secretariat. 62 8 "Under
NAFTA, it is possible, on any given day, to learn exactly
what cases have entered the Chapter 20, Chapter 19,
environmental, and labor systems; what the nature and
current status of each case is, and the approximate date on
' The
which rulings or reports in such cases will be issued."269
same policy of information disclosure should be uniformly
applied to all NAFTA proceedings, including Chapter 11
arbitrations, as well as future FTAA dispute resolution
procedures. As an institution, the proposed NAFTA
standing body could establish a reporting requirement that
would make public those decisions that deal with policies
that are public in nature. Furthermore, "[a] more
transparent reporting system is needed so that when a
dispute arises, interested parties will be able to gain
information concerning the dispute and take part."27 ° Once
again, the increased transparency of the system is vital to
promoting public trust and confidence, and curbing
criticism that democracy and national sovereignty are being
undermined.271
D. Explicit EnvironmentalSafeguards
There are numerous
additional proposals
for
improvement in the NAFTA Chapter 11 literature. For the
purposes of this article, which deals with incorporating an
improved investor-state dispute mechanism into the FTAA,
those additional proposals dealing specifically with the
"chilling" of environmental regulation are of particular
interest, and are considered generally below.
First, a broad coalition of U.S. environmental NGOs has
called for clear "environmental exceptions" to trade and
investment rules for laws and regulations designed to
protect public health, the environment and natural

268. Lopez, supra note 160, at 27. Chapter 19 deals with antidumping and
countervailing duty disputes, and Chapter 20 applies to controversies dealing
with the interpretation, application or breach of the Agreement. Both Chapters
provide for exclusively state to state dispute resolution. NAFTA, supra note 22,
Chs. 19, 20.
269. Lopez, supra note 160, at 27.
270. Jones, supra note 25, at 549.
271. Id.
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This group argues that principles of
''environmentally responsible trade" should inform all
aspects of U.S. trade policy, including the negotiations for
the Free Trade Area of the Americas.273 In essence,
environmental and labor NGOs, as well as other facets of
civil society, are demanding a voice in the FTAA
negotiations. Indeed, civil society probably has more of a
voice in the FTAA negotiations than in any trade
agreement to date.274 Whether this is actually desirable or
not is beyond the scope of this comment, but surely a
question of considerable significance in this new climate of
trade politics.
A second suggestion in relation to investor challenges to
environmental laws deals with clarifying the standard of
risk assessment. In cases where there is no discriminatory
intent, how should Chapter 11 tribunals determine whether
there is sufficient justification for regulatory action to bring
it within the "police powers" exception to expropriation?1
That is, what level of scientific proof is necessary to
establish a regulatory measure as justified to preserve the
environment or public health? The NAFTA has yet to
address this issue.276 The WTO requires a fairly high degree
of scientific proof and/or risk assessment, and the recent
WTO Beef Hormones decision effectively rejects the use of
the precautionary principle, which allows for regulatory
action on scientific proof that is somewhat less than
absolute, in the WTO.277 The NAFTA needs to develop a
reasonableness standard for government regulatory action,
resources. 2 72

272. The coalition consisted of the American Lands Alliance, Center for
International Environmental Law, Defenders of Wildlife, Earthjustice, Friends
of the Earth Institute for Agriculture & Trade Policy, National Environmental
Trust National Wildlife Federation, Natural Resources Defense Council, Pacific
Environment, and the Sierra Club. This coalition wrote a "Dear Representative"
letter urging opposition to fast track authority for the President. Included in
this letter is the Coalition's "Principles for Environmentally Responsible Trade."
The letter, dated June 27, 2001, and "Principles" can be accessed at
http://www.sierraclub.org/trade/fasttrack/letter.asp (last visited Aug. 21, 2003).
273. Id.
274. See Bruner, supra note 24, at 8-9. The FTAA has established a
committee to receive input from civil society to take into consideration in the
negotiations. While this is significant as compared with previous trade
agreement negotiations, some groups have questioned how substantive and
effective this participation really is. See id.
275. See Gantz, supra note 114, at 742.
276. Id. at 742.
277. Id. at 743.

20031

LESSONS FROM NAFTA

1193

perhaps one that recognizes the precautionary principle, as
in the Cartegena Protocol on Biosafety.278 "Among the
factors that could go into that analysis would be the extent
of the risk assessment, the availability of scientific evidence
on both sides of the issue, any existing international
standards and the nature and degree of health protection
that is sought under national law and policy." 279 Other
factors may include the legality of the regulation under
domestic law and a consideration of the economic feasibility
of less injurious alternatives, even without a requirement
that the environmental regulation be "necessary."
CONCLUSION

Investor-state arbitration is rapidly becoming among
the most controversial issues in the debate over the merits
of free trade and investment. Besides the criticisms from
environmental and citizen-protection groups, the Canadian
government is demonstrating increasing hostility toward
the NAFTA Chapter 11 mechanism, and more recently,
state lawmakers in the United States have expressed
concern that investor-state dispute mechanisms threaten
state authority and sovereignty.2 "1 Although clearly not a
harbinger for the death of liberal trade in North America,
public and interest group support is vital to sustaining the
legitimacy of free trade agreements such as NAFTA, the
GATT, and soon, the FTAA.
One of the most significant hurdles to the FTAA
negotiations has been the lack of fast-track negotiating
authority for the President since 1994. Fast track authority
essentially allows the President to negotiate international
trade agreements that are then submitted to Congress for
278. Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity,
Draft Cartegena Protocol on Biosafety, UNEP/CBD/ExCOP/l/L.5 (Jan. 28,
2003). The Cartegena Protocol provides the first "hard"international legal basis
for the precautionary principle, which allows states to take actions in the
absence of scientific proof. See Gantz, supra note 114, at 739. Although the
United States participated extensively in the drafting of the Protocol, it cannot
become a party to the Protocol because it is not a party to the Biodiversity
Convention. Id.
279. Id. at 744.
280. Id.
281. Tripp Baltz, State Lawmakers Worry About Sovereignty in Dispute
Resolution Language of TPA Bill, 19 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 32, 1385 (Aug. 8,
2002).
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approval on an up-or-down basis, preventing Congress from
amending the agreement in any manner.282 Controversy
over whether labor and environmental issues should be
included in trade agreements was the primary reason that
the Clinton Administration failed to obtain renewed fasttrack negotiating authority following the ratification of
NAFTA until the end of his presidency.283 Foreign
governments are reluctant to negotiate trade agreements
with the United States without fast-track authority because
of the potential that Congress could alter
28 4 the agreement of
the parties, or fail to ratify it altogether.
This obstacle has been removed, as President Bush was
granted Trade Promotion Authority ("TPA") (essentially a
new name for fast track), in August 2002.285 This should
bode well for the FTAA negotiations, as the United States
now has more bargaining power and credibility, and the
means to come to an agreement by January 2005. This also
means that Congress will most likely ratify whatever the
FTAA trade ministers agree to incorporate into the final
FTAA text, rather than decline the agreement in whole,
which would force the FTAA parties to start over again. The
prospect of little Congressional debate over the FTAA
because of TPA is a continuing source of concern for the
movement against free trade, which argues that fast track
procedures undermine democratic governance.
In this context, the foregoing analysis of the problems
with the investor-state dispute mechanism in NAFTA, and
the recommendations on improving it, take on a new sense
of importance. The FTAA will be the largest regional
trading bloc in the world. Can the region, even the world,
afford to allow the FTAA negotiating ministers to act as a
colossal "Dr. Frankenstein," by replicating NAFTA's
Chapter 11 for inclusion in the FTAA, thereby exporting
and expanding the problems of NAFTA to thirty-four
countries and more than 800 million people? Although
investor-state dispute settlement is, on the whole, a positive
development in international trade relations, and thus
worth preserving, we should not hesitate to improve on it.
Only by learning from the past can international trade
282.
283.
284.
285.

Tiefer, supra note 162, at 329.
See McClintock, supra note 163, at 19-20.
See Gantz, supra note 170, at 406-07.
See Yerkey, supra note 162, at 1374.
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regimes evolve and progress. Anything less undermines the
legitimacy and stability of the international trading regime
as a whole.
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Appendix A28
Case

Investor

1. Ethyl Corp.
v. Canada

U.S.

2. Crompton Corp.
v. Canada

U.S.

3. Ketcham
v. Canada

Procedural
Rules

Status

Award on
Jurisdiction
(6/24/98)
Notice of Intent to
Arb. (9/19/02)

UNCITRAL

U.S.

Abandoned

Unknown

4. Pope & Talbot
v. Canada

U.S.

Final (11/13/01);
Award on Costs
(4/26/02)

UNCITRAL

5. S.D. Meyers
v. Canada

U.S.

Final (10/21/02)

UNCITRAL

6. Signa S.A.
v. Canada

U.S.

Abandoned

Unknown

7. Sun Belt
v. Canada

U.S.

Abandoned

UNCITRAL

8. Trammel Crow
v. Canada

U.S.

Settled (4/02)

Unknown

9. UPS v. Canada

U.S.

Ongoing/Award on
Jurisdiction
(11/22/02)

UNCITRAL

Canada

Final (1/9/03)

ICSID AF

10. ADF Group
v. U.S.

Unknown

286. See Nafta Claims Website, at http://www.naftaclaims.comldisputes (last
updated Aug. 17, 2003); Marcia J. Staff & Christine W. Lewis, Arbitration
Under NAFTA Chapter 11: Past, Present, and Future, 25

333 (2003).
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Procedural

Rules
11. Canfor Corp.
V.U.S.
12. Doman v. U.S.

Canada

13. Glamis v. U.S.

Notice of Arb.
(7/9/02)
Notice of Arb.
(5/1/02)/Pending

UNCITRAL

Unknown

Notice of Intent to
Arb. (7/21/03)

Unknown

14. Loewen Group
v. U.S.

Canada

Dismissed
(6/26/03)

ICSID AF

15. Methenex v. U.S.

Canada

Award on
Jurisdicton
(8/2/02); Fresh
Notice of Arb.
(11/5/02)

UNCITRAL

16. Mondev v. U.S.

Canada

Final (10/11/02)

ICSID AF

17. Kenex v. U.S.

Canada

UNCITRAL

18. Tembec Corp.
v. U.S.

Unknown

Notice of Arb.
(8/2/02)
Notice of Intent to
Arb. (5/4/02)

19. Adams v. Mexico

U.S.

Notice of Arb.
(2/16/01)

UNCITRAL

20. Azinian
v. Mexico

U.S.

Final (11/1/99)

ICSID AF

21. Calmark
v. Mexico

U.S.

Notice of Intent to
Arb. (1/11/02)

Unknown

22. Corn Products
v. Mexico

U.S.

Notice of Intent to
Arb.
(1/28/03)/Ongoing

Unknown

23. Karpa v. Mexico

U.S.

Final (12/16/02)

ICSID AF

24. Lomas Santa Fe

U.S.

Notice of Intent to

Unknown

v. Mexico

Canada

Arb. (8/28/01)

Unknown

Unknown
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Procedural
Rules

25. Fireman's Fund
v. Mexico

U.S.

Notice of Arb.
(10/30/01)/
Pending

ICSID AF

26. Frank v. Mexico

U.S.

UNCITRAL

27. GAMI Invs.
v. Mexico

U.S.

Notice of Arb.
(08/5/02)
Notice of Arb.
(4/9/02)/Pending

28. Haas v. Mexico

U.S.

Notice of Intent to
Arb. (12/12/01)

Unknown

29. Halchette
v. Mexico

U.S.

Abandoned

Unknown

30. Metalclad Corp.
v. Mexico

U.S.

Final (9/2/00);
Upheld by British
Colombia Sup. Ct.
(5/2/01)

ICSID AF

31. Thunderbird
v. Mexico

Canada

Notice of Arb.
(8/1/02)

UNCITRAL

32. Waste Mgmt.
v. Mexico

U.S.

Award on
Jurisdiction
(6/26/02)/Ongoing

ICSID AF

UNCITRAL

